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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Decision-making generally features a dynamic dimension, in the sense that the outcome
of the decision is delayed in time and it depends on other moves that follow, may those
be taken by the same individual, by others, as well as by nature. It is indeed hard to
overestimate the prevalence of this type of decision settings.
Some can be represented as individual decision problems, including investment in
education or the choice of a retirement plan. Others have more apparent strategic fea-
tures: trading assets, entering a market, adopting a new technology, building social rela-
tions, voting.
It is crucial for both our comprehension of the aggregate outcomes, as well as to cor-
rectly predict the effects of policies, that we have good models of how the agents take
decisions in those domains.
Fully rational decision making requires, at least, that the agent is conscious of the
whole problem, including all available plans of action for each agent and the conse-
quences associated to each, and chooses optimally based on his preferences over such
outcomes and his beliefs about the others. Actual behavior, in particular as recorded by
controlled laboratory experiments, most often fails to conform to this benchmark and
bounded rationality is now widely incorporated into economic models.
In what follows, most of the efforts will be devoted to figuring out the specific chal-
lenges that decision-makers face in dynamic environments; to showing, through con-
trolled laboratory experiments, what consequences they have on actual behavior; and to
finding ways to account for those in economic models.
The main take of those exercises is that strategic thinking is bounded in a way that
is specific to the dynamic dimension of the interaction. In particular, in a sequence of
moves, those that are close to the current decision are the object of deep strategic consid-
eration, whereas distant ones are barely considered, resulting in systematic deviations
from both fully rational and alternative models that do not take this into account. We
1
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report data on three experiments. Despite huge differences, behavior is surprisingly con-
sistent among them. A majority of the population seems endowed, in all of the experi-
ments, with some form of limited look-ahead; the number of steps most subjects can look
forward to, is bounded between two and four.
Most notably, we show how we can successfully account for those bounds using sim-
ple and tractable models, that are likely to produce more accurate predictions in many
applications.
Foresight and farsightedness
We offer two different ways for accounting for bounded thinking in dynamic settings.
In sequential games of perfect information, we propose an out-of-equilibrium model
where backward reasoning is performed only locally, and to an extent that depends on
the foresight of the agent. An experiment on the race game shows the explicative power
of the model. Using a centipede game experiment, we also test the way in which the
foresight of the agents depends on the complexity of the environment. Overall, we see
this model as a proper dynamic analogue of level-k models.
In complex environments, such as network formation, we suggest a half-way solution
between the extremes of myopic and farsighted stability. Limited farsightedness makes
both myopically and farsightedly stable outcomes more fragile, either because, in the
former case, more deviations are available, or because, in the latter case, deviations are
not deterred by longer inferences. This is a desirable feature, given that, in general, both
approaches tend to predict too many outcomes.
The difference between foresight and farsightedness becomes all the more clear when
we move to the limited versions of both. Indeed, the clarification of this distinction is
a contribution that can be catched from these essays, while the two concepts are often
confused in the literature.
Consider a finite extensive form alternate-move game where the agent controlling
each decision node can choose whether to change state or not, and to each final state
corresponds an outcome for each player.
Under farsightedness, the agent controlling each decision node is considered as he
was comparing the final outcomes to the one corresponding to the current state. If one
state is preferred to the current one, the agent looks for a path of decisions/states, where
each subject choosing along the path makes the same consideration - i.e. prefers the final
state to the current one. If that is the case, this path will be a farsighted improving path.
Limited farsightedness would simply limit the length of those paths.
Under (limited) foresight, the agents consider the optimal choice of the agent choos-
ing at the end of his horizon. That is, if he prefers changing state or not, at all the possible
3states he may be choosing at. Taking these actions as given, he moves backwards and
solves for the next-to-last stage, and so on, figuring out a chain of best responses. Clearly,
such chain may not be a farsighted improving path. At the same time, a farsighted im-
proving path may not be a chain of best responses.
For example, on a chain of best replies, an agent may not prefer the final state to the
current one, but realize that the former is better than the one that would prevail in case
he took another action. On the other hand, a player that takes a move consistent with a
farsighted improving path will not anticipate if the move that follows, on the same path,
is part of a best reply or not.
This difference reflects the origin of the two concepts in non-cooperative and coop-
erative game theory, respectively. Indeed, the choice between the two largely depends
on the context, and in particular on how fine is the information available regarding the
details of the interaction.
The stability approach predicts which states will prevail, given a set of states, a pref-
erence ordering over states and a rule for comparing the states. One example of the latter,
is, indeed limited farsightedness. As such, this does not constitute a proper behavioral
model. This would require, at least, to be defined on a game protocol, an element which is
not necessary to apply farsightedness. Limited foresight, instead, is a fully strategic con-
cept. It does not simply tell us what we should expect, on aggregate, as the outcome of
a generic interaction, but predicts the behavior of agents facing an extensive form game,
all the details of which are then required.
Models of strategic thinking and limited foresight
In the last twenty years, different models have addressed the failures of fully rational,
game theoretic models, generally claiming more success in explaining and predicting
laboratory behavior1. Some of them are based on the assumption that the agents can
make errors (e.g. quantal response equilibrium - QRE [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995]);
others relax the equilibrium condition in that the players best reply to some (correct)
aggregate statistics of the others’ strategies (e.g. cursed equilibrium [Eyster and Rabin,
2005]; others relax in different ways the assumption of common knowledge of rationality
(k-rationalizabilty [Bernheim, 1984], level-k models [Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Stahl and
Wilson, 1995], cognitive hierarchy models [Camerer et al., 2004]).
Though those models were meant to target normal form games, some of them proved
suited to be adapted to the extensive form. For example, Ho and Su [2013] builds a dy-
namic level-k model, mixing elements of level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, and
1For an excellent survey, see Crawford et al. [2013]
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apply it to the centipede game; McKelvey and Palfrey [1998] propose Agent QRE as the
QRE counterpart for extensive form games, by spelling out the model in terms of behav-
ioral strategies; the analogy-based expectation equilibrium [Jehiel, 2005], is close in spirit
to a cursed equilibrium, applied to multistage games of perfect information.
There has been surprisingly little effort to capture the peculiar aspects of dynamic
strategic interactions, and in particular that the depth of strategic thinking can vary
throughout a game tree in a way that is not possible when considering the normal form.
Probably the first attempt in this direction, and indeed close to ours, is the work of Jehiel
[1995], where a notion of limited forecast equilibrium is presented for infinitely repeated
alternate-move games. Every player forecasts the future actions only within a restricted
horizon, and takes the action that maximizes his average payoff within it. In equilibrium,
their forecasts prove correct.
Jehiel [1998b] extends the limited forecast equilibrium to repeated simultaneous move
games. The utility of the players includes a term that captures the unawareness of the
players about what will come beyond their horizon of forecast. The equilibrium fore-
casts are correct on and off the equilibrium path, in the sense they coincide with the true
distribution of actions resulting from the behavioral strategies of the players. As shown
by Jehiel [2001], for intermediate discount factors, full cooperation can result, in the iter-
ated prisoner’s dilemma, as a limited forecast equilibrium outcome, whereas defection
cannot. A learning justification for those approaches is provided by Jehiel [1998a].
Those works all stick to equilibrium analysis. In those equilibria, however, the agents
appear to take the correct decisions for the wrong reasons. Their choices are based on a
coarsened representation of the game, not coinciding with that of the following players.
However, the others end up taking exactly the actions they expected. The proper defi-
nition of a strategy itself is somewhat problematic, as the players make plans of actions
only on a reduced set of nodes. Those arguments, in our view, show a sort of conflict
between limited foresight and equilibrium.
Diasakos [2008] proposes a model of limited foresight for individual decision prob-
lems. Limited foresight emerges endogenously as a solution to a two-stage optimization
problem. The agent chooses his foresight, balancing between (individual) search costs,
arising from the decision problem’s complexity, and the benefits of deeper reasoning.
Our attempt takes advantage of different features of those models. In particular, our
model of limited foresight is close in spirit to level-k models: we develop an out-of-
equilibrium model, based on a hierarchy of sophistication levels, each of which chooses
the action that best replies to the immediate lower level. We share with Jehiel’s contribu-
tions the idea of a limited horizon within which the agents make their plans. The way
in which we assume the agents to project, on their horizon, the consequences that are
5beyond their foresight, is similar to Diasakos’s.
Outline of the essays
In the first essay, we present a general out-of-equilibrium framework for strategic think-
ing in sequential games, Limited Backward Induction (LBI). It assumes the agents to take
decisions reasoning backwards on restricted game trees, according to their (limited) fore-
sight level. We develop a simple way in which the foresight is derived as a function of
the stakes of the game and its complexity, captured by an individual cost for thinking
forward; we also extend the model to apply it to infinite games.
We test for LBI using a variant of the race game, where the players take turns in
adding up numbers up to a final one. The player reaching this number wins a prize.
This game has special features that makes it particularly suited for identifying forward
looking behavior and backward reasoning. In particular, we can separate the predictions
of LBI from other models, without making any specific assumption on the preferences
of the subjects and their beliefs on their opponent’s strategies. In a treatment, we add a
small prize, off the equilibrium path, to identify reasoning on restricted game trees.
The results provide strong support in favor of LBI, showing that most players solve
for the small prize before they do for the final one. Only a small fraction of subjects play
close to equilibrium. Overall the intermediate prize keeps the subjects off the equilibrium
path longer than in the base game. The results cannot be rationalized using the most
popular models of strategic reasoning, let alone equilibrium analysis. Remarkably, the
players effort in making a decision, as recorded by the time it takes before acting, is very
low until the game gets close to one of the prizes; it then peaks steeply and then decrease
as it becomes clear who is going to get the prize. Most of the player are consistent with a
level of foresight of two, three or four steps.
In the second essay, we test a specific implication of LBI: that the foresight of the play-
ers - i.e. the number of steps of backward induction they are able to perform - is decreas-
ing in the complexity of the environment. We present the results of a novel experiment,
using a centipede game, where we manipulate complexity by reducing the availability
of information regarding the payoffs. We run three treatments featuring the same game,
but where the payoffs are represented in different ways.
We show that reduced availability of information is sufficient to shift the distribution
of take-nodes further from the equilibrium prediction, and similar results are obtained
in a treatment where reduced availability of information is combined with an attempt to
elicit preferences for reciprocity, through the presentation of the centipede as a repeated
trust game.
Behavior in the centipede game has been explained either by appealing to failures of
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
backward induction or by calling for preferences that induce equilibria consistent with
observed behavior. Our results could be interpreted as cognitive limitations being more
effective than preferences in determining (shifts in) behavior in our experimental cen-
tipede.
Furthermore our results are at odds with the recent ones in Cox and James [2012],
suggesting caution in generalizing their results. Reducing the availability of information
may hamper backward induction or induce myopic behavior, depending on the strategic
environment. Most notably, both effects can be rationalized within the framework of
limited backward induction.
In a nutshell, as complexity increases, the agents respond by reducing the number
of steps over which they perform strategic reasoning, but still incorporate the efficiency
gains that are achievable at distant nodes by projecting those payoffs on their foresight
bound. Beyond a certain threshold, however, on top of being able of very limited back-
ward reasoning, they stop considering distant payoffs, resulting in myopic behavior
(“take the money and run”).
In the third essay we change completely both the environment and the framework.
We investigate network formation and test for the stability notions that are there ap-
plied. Given the prevalence of interactions through social networks and the extraordi-
nary growth of the network literature in the recent years, we see the empirical founda-
tion and development of sensible models of network formation as mostly needed. More-
over, network formation is typically a complex environment, where bounded reasoning
is most likely to bind actual behavior.
Pairwise stability [Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996] is the standard stability concept in
network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do
not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are perfectly
farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network
formation experiment to test these theories.
Our results reject both of those extreme stability notions. In particular, we show that
the behavioral models they assume are both untenable. The agents are, instead, consis-
tent with a form of limited farsightedness. Both myopically and farsightedly stable net-
works are found to be fragile to farsighted deviations of short length (two, three steps).
The selection among pairwise stable networks seems to be driven by their resilience to
those deviations. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, no other theory can account for
the variance across treatments in the outcomes that we observe. Beyond this, we find
support for this interpretation in the analysis of individual behavior. Low level of far-
sightedness appear relevant to explain the choices of our subjects.
CHAPTER 2
LIMITED BACKWARD INDUCTION
Abstract
We present a general out-of-equilibrium framework for strategic thinking in se-
quential games. It assumes the agents to take decisions on restricted game trees,
according to their (limited) foresight level, following backward induction. Therefore
we talk of limited backward induction (LBI).
We test for LBI using a variant of the race game. Our design allows to identify re-
stricted game trees and backward reasoning, by introducing an intermediate task
before the final one, thus properly disentangling LBI behavior.
The results provide strong support in favor of LBI. Most players solve intermedi-
ate tasks - i.e. restricted games - without reasoning on the terminal histories. Only
a small fraction of subjects play close to equilibrium. An intermediate task keeps
the subjects off the equilibrium path longer, with respect to the case where it is not
present. The results cannot be rationalized using the most popular models of strate-
gic reasoning, let alone equilibrium analysis.
JEL classification: D03, C51, C72, C91
Keywords: Behavioral game theory, sequential games, strategic thinking, level-k.
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2.1 Introduction
How do you figure out your moves in a chess game? We would say that most people
think of what the other is going to do next; some think of their next move as well, and
maybe of the opponent following choice. Deep consideration of further stages character-
izes chess lovers and professionals1. This behavior is just backward induction performed
on a limited number of stages. In a nutshell, that represents what we call limited back-
ward induction (LBI). Going back to chess, it is reasonable that we will look further ahead
as our king (or the opponent’s) is plainly menaced. At the same time, we will able to
push our reasoning deeper as the action space shrinks throughout the game, or in games
where the action space is more limited, such as tic-tac-toe. This paper presents a model
that catches such features of strategic reasoning in sequential games and presents a novel
experiment meant to test for it.
The strategic ability of human beings, as recorded form the experimental literature,
seems more limited than assumed in game theory2. Backward induction is no exception
(e.g. Binmore et al. [2002]) and has been long criticized as well on theoretical ground3.
Different studies have suggested that the players use limited look-ahead in extensive
form games, and among others the works of Binmore et al. [2002] and Johnson et al.
[2002]. In the latter study, the subjects have to look up for the payoffs along different
nodes by clicking on them; the authors show that the players focus on the current stage
and the following, paying little attention on more distant ones.
In the last twenty years, different models have addressed the issue, generally claiming
more success in the lab than competing fully-rational models. An excellent survey of
the subject can be found in Crawford et al. [2013]. Despite those models were meant
to target normal form games, some of them proved suited to be adapted to extensive
form. As an example, Ho and Su [2013] builds a dynamic level-k model to be applied
on the centipede game4, while McKelvey and Palfrey [1998] proposed the agent quantal
response equilibrium (AQRE) as the QRE counterpart for sequential games. An attempt
closer to ours is that of Jehiel [1995]; his limited forecast equilibrium is close in spirit to
our approach, although it sticks to equilibrium analysis. An independent attempt, similar
to ours, is being carried out at the moment by Roomets [2010]. Despite many similarities,
in his paper, the level of foresight is exogenously given and not endogenous to the game,
as in ours; the way in which intermediate payoffs are derived is largely unspecified; most
1The literature on chess heuristics is vast and spans from artificial intelligence to psychology. See for
example Reynolds [1982] and De Groot et al. [1996]
2Excellent surveys can be found in Kagel and Roth [1995], Smith [1994] and Selten [1998].
3Aumann and Binmore gave life to a famous crosstalk on the subject. See Aumann [1996] and Binmore
[1996].
4Kawagoe and Takizawa [2012] study classic results on the centipede game with a similar model.
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notably, in Roomets [2010] there is no experimental test of the model.
Beyond this, no model of strategic thinking attempted to address the specific aspects
of dynamic strategic environments, which is the goal of the present paper. In carrying out
the task, we retain the intuition underlying backward induction, but we limit the number
of stages on which it is performed. As such, LBI is best suited for studying multistage
games with observable actions, characterized by perfect information.
Under LBI, a player faces a reduced game tree, called the limited-foresight game (LF-
game), that encompasses only the stages of the game that are closer to the current deci-
sion node. For each (pseudo-)terminal history of the LF-game, intermediate values are
determined, based on the final payoffs that are consistent with it; finally, actions con-
sistent with a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in the LF-game are taken. The higher
the level of foresight, the more stages are included in the LF-game so that, in the limit,
this coincides with the whole game and the actions taken are consistent with subgame
perfection.
We use a variant of the Race game (also known as the Game of 21) to identify LBI. In
this simple game players alternate to choose numbers within a range; those are added up,
until a certain target number is reached. The player who reaches it wins a prize, the other
loses. One of the players has an advantage at the beginning of the race, and can secure
the victory of the prize. This possibility transfers to the other player in case of error. Each
player has a family of dominant strategies that can be identified by backward induction
and should be played in any SPE. Because this is in (weakly) dominant strategies, Level-k
players [Costa-Gomes et al., 2001] should play consistent with equilibrium.
Previous results [Dufwenberg et al., 2010; Gneezy et al., 2010; Levitt et al., 2011] show
little compliance with equilibrium predictions. The subjects seem to discover the solution
as they play and find it hard to substitute a subgame with its outcome, even after gaining
experience. We replicate those results in a base treatment and show how they are due to
a LBI type of reasoning, using a second treatment. The treatment variable is the presence
of a small prize on the path to the final target. This manipulation is suited to identify
reasoning on a restricted game tree (the LF-game). We also introduce, in both treatments,
the (incentivized) possibility to claim victory of any prize at any time in the game; this
helps us tracking which prize the subjects are targeting beyond their observed actions.
Our results are stark. Most subjects solve for the trap prize before they do for the
final one. This is consistently witnessed by both their actions and their claims, as their
claims of the trap prize anticipate those for the final one and subjects reach the path to the
former earlier than that to the latter. The timing of their decisions shows how reasoning
efforts emerge only when the game approaches one of the prizes - i.e. when this enters
the LF-game. In the presence of the small prize, the players stay off the equilibrium path
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longer that when the small prize is absent. On aggregate, we provide strong support in
favor of a LBI type of reasoning. The majority of the population proves able to run no
more than two or three stages of backward induction in our race game, whilst only a
small fraction of the subjects play consistent with equilibrium5.
We propose a formal model of LBI. Given a game, the foresight of an agent is de-
termined after considering how relevant the stakes are - i.e. how beneficial strategic
reasoning can be - and how complex the game is - i.e. how costly strategic reasoning can
be. This determines the set of histories that are object of strategic consideration. To build
the LF-game, he then needs to assign payoffs to intermediate nodes, and in particular to
the pseudo-terminal histories of the LF-game.
This is done by projecting the payoffs that arise beyond the foresight of the agent, and
are consistent with each pseudo-terminal history being reached. In the chess example, a
valuation of an intermediate node would depend mostly on the value assigned to the
single pieces, this being associated to the likelihood of winning after losing that piece6.
In games where stage-payoffs are gained the model can be extended to tackle infinite
games, and encompasses perfect myopia as a special case.
We find our attempt to have the same flavor of level-k models. Indeed, LBI is a hierar-
chy of decision rules, where each level best responds to the rule which is one step lower
in the hierarchy. The chain of best replies is anchored to the behavior of a non-strategic
level, which, in our case, is represented by the agent choosing before the foresight bound.
Despite those similarities, LBI predictions will generally diverge from the level-k ones in
many contexts, as made clear by our design. Both level-k and LBI constitute out-of-
equilibrium models of behavior and should be understood to capture initial responses to
a game.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2.2 provides an informal description of LBI
and draw some didactic examples; section 2.3 offers a formal model of LBI; 2.4 introduces
the race game and the related experimental literature; section 2.5 presents the experimen-
tal design and procedures; section 2.6 shows results and section 2.7 concludes.
5Experiments on level-k thinking, has suggested similar shares of levels of reasoning in the population.
Note, however, that the type of reasoning assumed is completely different.
6An appropriate evaluation will depend on the position of the pieces as well, however most chess manu-
als report standardized pieces’ values [Capablanca, 2006, e.g.] and those are regularly used by computerized
chess players [Levy and Newborn, 1991].
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2.2 A sketch of Limited Backward Induction
Consider7 the four-stage game in Figure 2.1, where each outcome a, ...,p is a vector inR2,
identifying von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities for each player. According to backward
induction, player 1 knows what player 2 is choosing after every history in stage four. He
can substitute the preferred outcomes to the decision nodes of stage four and roll over
this reasoning to determine what actions are chosen by himself in stage three and by
player 2 in stage two. Finally, he picks his best reply to those profiles in stage one, which
results in a SPE of the game.
Suppose player 1 is not able to run backward induction from the terminal histories
of the game, because of limited foresight. The dashed line in Figure 2.1 represents his
foresight bound, implying he best replies to what he believes the next player is choosing,
without conditioning on the following moves. In the terminology of LBI, his level of
foresight is two: the LF-game he can solve includes two stages. We label such a player
F2.
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Figure 2.1: A four-stages sequential game with a foresight bound
In order to figure out what his opponent is going to do in stage 2, he needs some
intermediate valuations for the pseudo-terminal histories of the LF-game. Provided that
he knows the final outcomes of the game, he uses this information to retrieve the inter-
mediate valuations. Each payoff of the LF-game will be derived as a projection of the
payoffs of the complete game that are consistent with each pseudo-terminal history. As
7See section 2.3 for a formal tractation.
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an example, the payoffs considered in the LF-game at the pseudo-terminal history (L,W)
will be a function of a,b,c,d, those after (L, E) of e, f,g,h, and so on. If player 1 was F3
- i.e. he had a foresight of three stages - the dashed line in figure 2.1 would move one
stage downwards. The LF-game would be larger and its payoffs would be derived from
smaller sets of final outcomes.
For general purposes, we propose to use as a projection function the median point
in the range of the available payoffs.8 We back this rule because it is as simple as pos-
sible, intuitive and avoids some drawbacks that other candidates face in some common
environments.9
Notably, the proper definition of the projection function will be completely irrelevant
in our experimental test. We will discuss further the issue of intermediate payoffs in the
formal set up (see section 2.3.3), where we also discuss the possibility of departures from
this rule.
To fix ideas, assume player has a foresight of k stages; call the decision rule of this
player Fk. By construction, the LF-game he is facing in the first stage includes k stages.
Reasoning backward, his implicit belief is that the player choosing at the last stage of
the LF-game is of level F1. This player, who serves as anchor of the LBI reasoning, is
non-strategic, in the sense that he does not perform any strategic reasoning. The player
controlling the next-to-last decision nodes is believed to act as level F2, and so on. Thus,
player one will best responds to the following player, assumed to choose as Fk−1, who
best responds to Fk−2, . . . , who best responds to F1.
Provided that the foresight bounds of players choosing sequentially do not coincide,
beliefs about the next players’ chosen actions will generally prove incorrect. The actions
chosen by one single player need not be consistent one with the other. Those observa-
tions clarify that LBI is an out-of-equilibrium model of the initial responses to a game, by
untrained subjects.
The sketch of LBI we have given is perfectly sufficient to understand the experimental
part of the paper. A reader not interested in the examples and in the formal set up may
then want to jump to section 2.4, which is self-contained.
2.2.1 Examples
We here sketch how LBI can be applied to a couple of classical examples. We briefly draw
predicted behavior and compare it to the experimental evidence.
Centipede game The centipede game (see Figure 2.2) has long been a major workhorse
8That is: the simple average between the minimum and the maximum of the available payoffs.
9See the discussion on the simple average in sequential bargaining in Section 2.2.1.
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for investigations of backward induction, as for its simple sequential structure10. It is a
two-player, finite sequential game in which the subjects alternate choosing whether to
end the game ("take") or to pass to the other player ("pass"). The payoff from taking in
the current decision node is greater than that received in case the other player takes in
the next one, but less than the payoff earned if the other player were to pass as well.
The player making the final choice is paid more from taking than from passing, and
would therefore be expected to take. Iterating this argument, backward induction leads
to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium: the game is stopped at the first decision node,
implying a huge efficiency loss.
Experimental evidence has shown little compliance with SPE in the laboratory11. The
typical results feature a bell-shaped distribution of endnodes. Figure 2.3 depicts the re-
sults from the six-leg centipede in the seminal paper of McKelvey and Palfrey [1992].
Beyond the failure of SPE, robust findings show that longer games result, ceteris paribus,
in higher endnodes.
Figure 2.2: The six-legs centipede game in McKelvey and Palfrey [1992]
Under LBI, a subject playing the centipede in Figure 2.2 may not reason strategically
on the whole game. As an example, consider the case where the decision rule of player
one is F4; at the beginning of the game, he reasons backwards from the second deci-
sion node controlled by his opponent. After a pass (P) at that node the LF-game ends
with a pseudo-terminal history, over which the following payoffs are projected. You may
picture this as if a paper was covering the last two decision nodes, and reporting the in-
termediate payoffs after the last P that if visible. As those are assumed to be the median
within the range of available payoffs, in this case the intermediate payoffs will be: (144,
72). Player two is expected to pass at that node (72 > 32) and, thus, the same will be
expected at previous nodes, leading player one to choose P. A similar reasoning can be
10With respect to the motivations underlying the players’ choices, the centipede game proves much less
simple than it may seem at a first look. We do not think it is a good test of backward induction, and for this
reason we chose a different game for our experiment.
11See, for example: Levitt et al. [2011]; McKelvey and Palfrey [1992]; Palacios-Huerta and Volij [2009];
Zauner [1999].
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of endnodes in McKelvey and Palfrey [1992]
applied at every decision node and for different decision rules (F1, F2,. . . ).
In this example a player does not take until the terminal histories are included in his
LF-game, because at the foresight bound the (intermediate) payoff from P is higher12 than
the payoff from T. As soon as terminal histories are included in the LF-game of a player,
he takes. This happens later in the game, ceteris paribus, if the centipede features more
decision nodes.
In the example, for player one, F1 prescribes to always pass, F2 and F3 to take at the
next to last node, F4 and F5 to take from the third node on, and higher levels to always
take; for player two, F1 and F2 prescribe to take at the last node; F3 and F4 to take from
the fourth node on, and higher levels to always take. The results in Figure 2.3, would be
explained by a population mainly composed by F3 and F4, plus a significative fraction of
F1 and F2; note however that those result are based on averages over ten repetitions. The
initial response results display a shift toward lower foresight levels13.
Note that, for an agent to choose T, it is not necessary, in general, that the terminal
12Note that this holds true for any projection function satisfying some basic axioms (see section 2.3.3 for
a discussion of those). For example, the average of the n payoffs that come after a payoff of x is in the form
(1/2+ 4+ 2+ 16...)x/n > x.
13For the first game: a majority of F2 and F3, plus some F1 and F4.
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histories of the centipede game are included in the LF-game. The point, at which a player
with a certain foresight takes, crucially depends on the progression of the payoffs14, as
this determines the relation between the intermediate payoffs and the last visible actual
ones. In general, the initial behavior of the majority of the experimental subjects in stan-
dard centipede games, proves consistent with the population shares outlined above15.
Sequential bargaining In sequential bargaining (see Figure 2.4), two players must agree
on the division of a cake that shrinks every time they do not find an agreement (generally
intended as the effect of a discount factor). The players alternate in making an offer, with
the other player either accepting, in which case the game ends and the proposed split
is implemented, or rejecting, in which case the cake is reduced and they move to a new
stage, switching the roles. In finite bargaining, the last round is an ultimatum game. Its
solution provides the minimal acceptable offer in the previous stage. This reasoning can
be iterated backwards up to the first stage. In the unique SPE, in every stage, the proposer
submits the minimal acceptable offer, the responder accepts any offer weakly higher than
the minimal acceptable one, so that the first offer is accepted and the game stops.
Broadly speaking, the existing experimental evidence16 shows that offers are, on av-
erage, more generous than in the SPE, and those offers that are close to equilibrium are
often rejected. In general, and contrary to the theory, the first offers are relatively stable,
independently of the number of bargaining stages17.
Figure 2.4: The sequential bargaining game in Johnson et al. [2002]
14See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the issue.
15See Kawagoe and Takizawa [2012] for a presentation of classical initial response results in the centipede
game.
16See, for example, Binmore et al. [2002]; Bolton [1991]; Harrison and McCabe [1996]; Johnson et al. [2002];
Ochs and Roth [1989].
17The number of stages is the major determinant of who retains more bargaining power, by determining
the roles in the last round, which is an ultimatum game.
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Consider the game in Johnson et al. [2002], in Figure 2.4; the cake is initially worth $5
and it is halved at every new round, up to the third. They find a first round average offer
of around $2.10, against a SPE of $1.26; half of the offers below $2 were rejected. They also
report on a treatment where other-regarding preferences are switched off, using robots
as opponents: the average first-round offer declines to $1.84.
Under LBI, a first mover may not consider all rounds of bargaining. Crucially, if
the last round is not included within his LF-game, the player understates the minimal
acceptable offer by the respondent in the next to last round, because he does not foresee
that, in the following stage, he will be the proposer in an ultimatum game. In turns, this
implies that such a first proposer makes a better offer than in the SPE.
Recall the players use the median value of the available payoffs to compute the in-
termediate payoffs of the LF-game18. A first mover who only sees the first round of bar-
gaining19, assumes intermediate values following a rejection of $1.25 each. His best reply
will be to offer P ∼= $1.25, which, by chance20 matches the subgame perfect equilibrium
offer.
A first mover whose LF-game includes the first two rounds of bargaining, assumes
intermediate values following a rejection in round two of $0.625 each. Reasoning back-
wards, he expects, in the second round, player 2 to offer P ∼= $0.63, and keep $1.87 for
himself. The offer that best replies to this belief is P ∼= $1.87 in the first round. This
prediction perfectly matches the average offer in the robot treatment of Johnson et al.
[2002]21.
Moreover, given a distribution of LBI types, the length of the game does not affect the
behavior of all the first movers whose foresight does not reach the terminal histories. This
implies that, given a discount factor and an initial pie, despite the equilibrium prediction
varies with the length of the game, this should have a minor impact on the distribution
of the first offers.
18We note that the simple average would be problematic in sequential bargaining. This is readily clear if
offers are a compact set, as in the example, but is true also in the case of a finite set of possible offers: the
simple average of the terminal payoffs implies an over-representations of all the zeros that follow a rejection.
See section 2.3 for a discussion.
19We here talk of foresight levels referring to rounds of bargaining, and not to stages, as the game trun-
cated after an offer has little meaning.
20It is not generally true that low foresight levels match subgame perfect first offers. In this case it is an
artifact stemming from the specific discount factor. It is however true, in general, that as subsequent rounds
of bargaining are covered, the initial offer oscillates, being lower (higher) when an even (odd) number of
rounds are not included in the LF-game.
21The fact that in human vs. human treatments offers are even higher, suggests that other-regarding
preference play a role beyond cognitive limitations in this game.
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2.3 A formalization of LBI
2.3.1 General notation
Take a set I of players, #I = I finite, playing a multistage game of perfect information
with T + 1 stages (t = 0,1, ..., T), with T finite22. As usual, a history at the beginning of
stage t is a collection of actions in the form ht = (a0, a1, ..., at−1). Let Ai(ht) be the finite
set of feasible actions for player i when history is ht and Ht the set of all histories at
stage t, with HT+1 the set of terminal histories. Then: Ai(Ht) =
⋃
ht∈Ht Ai(ht). Recall that
perfect information implies that at every stage t and history ht for exactly one player it
holds that #Ai(ht) > 1. Function l : H \ HT+1→ I is the mapping of who moves at each
non-terminal history. Utilities are in the form ui : HT+1→R.
This defines a game G =
(I , H, l, (ui)i∈I).
For any history ht, let Ght be the game that starts at ht; HT+1|ht : {hT+1 = (ht, at, at+1, ..., aT)}
will be the corresponding set of terminal histories. Let the set of terminal utilities that are
viable after ht be
uh
t
i = {ui(hT+1) s.t. hT+1 ∈ HT+1|ht}.
2.3.2 Foresight
We turn to the players’ foresight, representing the depth of a player’s strategic thinking. It
is derived as a function of the stakes of the game, Dh
t
i , and its complexity C
ht
i . We denote
the level of foresight of a player with:
K =
⌊
f (Dh
t
i ,C
ht
i )
⌋
and we denote with FK a player with foresight of K steps that uses LBI. One can
think of the stakes as representing the benefits of further steps of strategic reasoning.
Complexity, on the other hand, represent their cognitive cost. In this light, we can think
of foresight determination as an optimization problem.23
We assume that the level of foresight is increasing in the stakes and decreasing in
complexity: fChti
< 0, fDhti
> 0. One could argue, in analogy with standard assumptions
on utility and cost of effort functions, in favor of concavity in the stakes ( fDht
iL
Dht
iL
< 0), and
convexity in complexity ( fCht
iL
Cht
iL
> 0). Despite we see those as sensible assumptions, they
are not strictly needed in our framework.
A player engages in more steps of strategic reasoning the higher the stakes of the
game, and the lower its complexity. Though intuitively appealing, it is indeed challeng-
22See Section 2.3.4 for an extension to infinite games.
23See Diasakos [2008] for a similar approach to individual decision problems.
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ing to formally define stakes and complexity, not to mention any specific functional form.
Consistent with the purpose of proposing a general framework, we define stakes as a
function of the payoffs that are viable after the history at which the agent chooses, assum-
ing weak monotonicity in the payoffs and in their variance, and complexity as function
of the number of the corresponding terminal histories, plus an individual cost parameter,
increasing in both terms. Thus Dh
t
i = d(uht) and C
ht
i = e(ci,#H
T+1|ht).
FK determines the set of the histories of the LF-game, defined as
Hht,K = {Ht+k|ht}Kk=0.
The pseudo-terminal histories of the LF game are then Ht+K|ht .
A natural extension of this definition of foresight is to take into account how stakes and
complexity vary over the action space of the subject, letting FK vary over the set Ht+1|ht .
In general, simplicity reasons suggest not to consider such a case, but one should keep in
mind this is possible, for the cases where those differences are likely to be relevant.
Beyond being intuitively reasonable, the assumption that strategic reasoning is af-
fected, in the predicted way, by exogenous variations in stakes and complexity is backed
by a number of experimental results. As an example, Rapoport et al. [2003] provides ev-
idence that most players prove consistent with SPE in a high-stakes centipede game; in
Chapter 3 we will show that a marginal increase in complexity can shift behavior in the
centipede game away from the SPE.
2.3.3 Intermediate payoffs and the LF-game
Let Hti be the set of histories controlled by player i, H
t
i = {ht s.t. #Ai(ht) > 0}. At each
node in this set, player i is characterized by a level of foresight, FK. This level specifies,
at every history, a restricted game form (I , Hht,K, l). To complete the LF-game, utilities
must be defined over the pseudo-terminal histories Ht+K|ht . Let those be a mapping in
the form:
vi : {uhti }ht∈H\HT+1 →R.
The intermediate utilities are functions of the set of consequences – i.e. terminal util-
ities – that are consistent with the pseudo-terminal history they refer to. In principle,
different subjects may have different mappings and the same subject may use different
mappings for different pseudo-terminal histories. Despite this, we will not consider these
possibilities in the general case.
Thus, letting v be the mapping of the intermediate utilities; the LF-game at history ht,
2.3. A FORMALIZATION OF LBI 19
controlled by an agent with foresight FK, is:
Ght,K = (I , Hht,K, l,v).
As already stressed, the proper definition of the projection function will be completely
irrelevant in our experimental test, so that we avoid the problem of jointly testing for the
foresight level and the projection function. However, in applications, one wants to make
intermediate utilities operational. Up to now, we only constrained them to depend only
on payoffs consistent with the pseudo-terminal history they refer to. As a general rule,
we propose24 v to map the viable terminal utilities into the median value within their
range, or, equivalently, the average between the minimum and the maximum in the set:
vi(uhi ) =
max(uhi ) + min(u
h
i )
2
.
This projection function is simple: it requires a parsimonious use of information aris-
ing at distant nodes and minimal computation. Despite this, it gives a rough idea of what
one can expect to gain from a game, after a certain history is reached.
Allowing for departures from this benchmark rule would leave the model with a
number of degrees of freedom that is similar to those that arise from the definition of the
L0 player in level-k models, or from the choice of the noise element in QRE. We generally
discourage changes to the projection function for this reason. However, we are aware that
a one-fits-all solution is unlikely to be reasonable in every possible game. For example, if
the distribution of the available payoffs after some history is particularly skewed, we may
want our projection to account for this; if the payoff structure is particularly simple (e.g.
one payoff for winning and one for losing) the subjects may extract too little information
from the proposed rule, whereas it would be quite immediate, for example, to count the
number of victories after every history (which would be equivalent to using the simple
average). Thus, in an attempt to balance the need for identification with that of flexibility,
we admit that, in case there is a strong reason to do so, one could choose a different
projection function.
In the spirit of the model, this should always be a simple and intuitive one. We put
forward a set of properties, indeed quite standard, that must be satisfied by any specifi-
cation of the intermediate utilities.
Definition 1. Given any two histories h, h′ ∈ Ht such that, min{uhi } ≥max{uh
′
i }, intermediate
24The question of how do the subjects consider payoffs that are far from the current decision node is, in
the end, an empirical one. Note, however, that any experimental investigation aimed at answering to it must
carefully consider that the foresight and the projection function are generally jointly tested, so that a neat
disentangling of those may prove complicated.
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utilities satisfy dominance iff vi(u(h)) ≥ vi(u(h′)).
Dominance states that if all the utilities viable after a certain history are higher than
those after another history, then the former should be preferred to the latter. A stronger
version is the following, postulating that a history is preferred over another if each utility,
that is viable after the former, beats the corresponding one, that is viable after the latter,
after ordering both sets in the same way. Given uhi and u
h′
i with the same cardinality, let
∆uh,h
′
i be the set containing the pairwise differences between the ordered elements of the
two sets.
Definition 2. Given any two histories h, h′ ∈ Ht such that #HT+1|h = #HT+1|h′ and ∆uh,h
′
i > 0,
intermediate payoffs satisfy stage monotonicity iff vi(u(h)) ≥ vi(u(h′)).
Extension monotonicity states that, if the set of utilities viable after some history, is the
same as those after another history, plus some utilities that are less valued (more valued)
than the previous ones, than the latter (former) history is preferred to the former (latter).
Definition 3. Given any two histories h, h′ ∈ Ht such that uhi ⊆ uh
′
i , intermediate payoffs satisfy
extension monotonicity iff:
i. max(uh
′
i \ uhi ) ≤ min(uhi )⇒ vi(u(h)) ≥ vi(u(h′))
ii. min(uh
′
i \ uhi ) ≥ max(uhi )⇒ vi(u(h′)) ≥ vi(u(h))
The simple average, a rule assuming random choices beyond the foresight bound and
the benchmark range median are examples that satisfy definitions 1-3.
On the LF-game the agents take decisions following backward induction. The agent
choosing at ht starts by finding the optimal actions of the subjects that controls the histo-
ries Ht+K−1|ht . He then moves to Ht+K−2|ht , taking the optimal actions in the following
stage as given. And so on, until he reaches ht. His actions are then consistent with a
subgame perfect equilibrium in the LF-game25. The following statements are true.
Proposition 1. i. For any FK, LBI always prescribes at least one action.
ii. If t+K≥ T + 1 the actions prescribed by LBI are all and only those that are part of a subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy of the game.
iii. For K→∞, LBI prescribes all and only the actions that are consistent with a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game.
25One may think of extending the model to limited forward induction, possibly applying it to incomplete
information games. In our context, as the LF-game (and the whole game) is one of perfect and complete
information, (limited) forward induction and (limited) backward induction are equivalent within an LF-
game.
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The proofs are self-evident and are omitted. Given a population featuring a certain
distribution of levels of foresight, the actions consistent with LBI become closer to equi-
librium as we approach the end of the game, in the sense that these actions will be, at
some point, consistent with (the last portion of) SPE strategies. This happens because,
when the foresight of players reaches the terminal histories, their actions are then consis-
tent with a SPE of the subgame they are deciding in26. As the agents gain experience27,
their level of foresight can increase and their actions will converge toward SPE28.
2.3.4 An extension: stage payoffs and sight
Until now we retained the assumption that the players know the terminal payoffs of the
game. We here extend the model, for a broad class of games, to cases where such an
assumption may not hold. Assume the players disregard the payoffs that arise after a
certain history. This may happen for games of special length, including infinite games,
and where retrieving the information about the payoffs cost a high effort to the subject29.
We introduce a property that will be useful in what follows.
Definition 4. Payoffs are said to satisfy Additive Separability (AS) if:
ui =
T
∑
t=0
pii(at),
where pii(at) is the single stage payoff resulting from actions consistent with hT+1.
In other words, a game displays additive separability of payoffs if utilities can be
represented as the sum of the payoffs gained along the game. Among the examples
presented in Section 2.2.1 the centipede game satisfies AS, while iterated bargaining does
not.
With a slight abuse of notation let pii(ht¯) = ∑t¯t=0pii(at), and, and, for t2 ≥ t1,
pi
Ht2 |
ht1
i = {pii(ht2) s.t. ht2 ∈ Ht2 |ht1}.
26This matches a common experimental finding, perfectly depicted by our experiment.
27LBI is a model of first responses. We leave the explicit modeling of how experience can shift behavior
to future investigation.
28This does not imply that the agents will improve their level of foresight and converge to SPE in all
situations.
29One may see this as a way to incorporate present-biased preferences. Despite the fact that disregarding
distant payoffs and considering the closer ones is certainly an instance of present-bias, this interpretation is
not correct, at least in the standard sense, given our assumption that the terminal utilities are von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities. Indeed we avoid talking about discounting only for simplicity reasons, as nothing
would change in the model if we included it.
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That is, the set of cumulative payoffs at stage t2, that are viable after ht1 .
Given any L ∈N+, an agent with sight SL at history ht sees all histories in {Hl |ht}t+Ll=t+1
and the corresponding payoffs. Note that his sight reaches the terminal histories only if
t + L ≥ T + 1; when this is not the case, we will talk about cognitive-terminal histories
referring to the set Ht+L|ht ; if L≥ T + 1 the player sees all relevant information about the
game from the very first stage, which would bring us back to the base model. With a
slight abuse of notation we will interpret t + L as min{t + L, T + 1}, to avoid specifying
such minimum every time.
If the payoffs satisfy additive separability, the sight of a player always provides in-
formation about utilities to players, the same is not true if this property is not satisfied.
More precisely, given AS, a sight SL identifies a game, and allows the player to build the
LF-game, according to the description that follows. Absent AS, only a game form is spec-
ified, with no possibility to build the LF-game, except for the case when t + L ≥ T + 1.
To clarify the point, imagine you are playing chess knowing all the rules, except that
the first who checkmates wins the match. There is no way of playing meaningfully with-
out information about the payoffs. Suppose now you are playing tennis, knowing all the
rules except for the match-winning rule30. You can still play meaningfully and have fun
since you know how to score and to win games.
The usual way in which a game is presented, absent AS, implies, ipso facto, that L≥ T
and thus the sight of players reaches the terminal histories 31. In particular, in economic
experiments, the subjects are generally informed of the final payoffs, and the experi-
menter makes sure that they understood, at least, that point. This is not granted in real
life games, for the cases where the payoffs arise stage after stage. That is why we implic-
itly assumed, in the base model, that the sight of the players always reaches the terminal
histories. When AS is satisfied, we can drop this assumption.
The sight of a player is exogenously given. It captures a player’s understanding of the
game, with no relation to strategic considerations. At ht, SL defines a game
G|ht,L =
(
I ,{Hl |ht}t+Ll=t+1, l,
(
pi
Ht+L|ht
i
)
i∈I
)
.
The foresight of the players is determined from this game, implying that only the infor-
mation provided by one’s sight is used.
The rest of the model follows as before, except for an update in the notation. In
particular, stakes, complexity, and the intermediate payoffs must be assessed according
30For example, you do not know how many games are there in a set, and how many sets are needed to
win the match
31See Chapter 3 for a discussion and an experiment on representation effects in the centipede game
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to SL, in terms of cognitive-terminal histories and the related payoffs, so that:
Dh
t
iL = d(pi
Ht+L|ht
i ),
Ch
t
iL = e(ci,#H
t+L|ht) and
vi : {piH
t+L|ht
i }ht∈H\HT+1 →R.
Under AS, this extended version of LBI can deal with infinite games, implicitly as-
suming that agents will treat them as finite ones32. Also, if the sight of the agent is re-
stricted to the extent that it coincedes with his foresight, LBI admits myopic behavior and
beliefs of myopic behavior on the part of others, as a special case.
2.3.5 Strategic reasoning in LBI and in level-k models
There are many similarities between LBI and level-k models. Both are first-response mod-
els. Their scope is to explain the out-of-equilibrium behavior of untrained subjects and
to predict to which equilibrium the subjects are likely to converge, in case they do.
LBI and level-k models are based on a hierarchy of decision rules, such that each one
best replies to the next lower one. Finally, this chain of best replies is anchored to a non-
strategic rule, L0 and F1, in level-k and LBI, respectively. Those are non strategic in the
sense that they do not form any belief about the others: L0 is generally modeled as a
randomizer, F1 optimize over the intermediate payoffs that follow his decision node.
However, LBI distinguishes from level-k in many aspects. A level-k agent knows the
actions chosen by the agents with a level between 0 and k− 1, and best replies to the k− 1
action. When applied to dynamic contexts [Ho and Su, 2013; Kawagoe and Takizawa,
2012] the players specify an action plan for the whole game, consistently with their belief
about the others’ level. A player of level-k assumes the opponents are of level k− 1, and
they believe the others are of level k− 2.
Under LBI, the agent of type FK applies backward induction on a restricted game
tree. In doing so, he acts as if he imposed decreasing levels of foresight on the agents
that control the following nodes: the next player to be active is assumed to act as FK−1,
the following as FK−2. The agent controlling a node at K − 1 stages of distance from
the current one perform no strategic reasoning, in the sense that he does not consider
strategically the others’ choices.
Thus, LBI agents have not a consistent belief about the decision rules of the players,
including themselves, in the sense that they impose a lower level of foresight both on the
others and on themselves, when considering choices at more distant future nodes. This
32As K ≤ L, the level of foresight is always finite.
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entails that the actions of the same player need not be consistent throughout the game.
New information is taken into account as the player explores new portions of the game
tree, and the action plan changes accordingly.
Level-k and LBI distinguish for different inconsistencies across levels of higher order
beliefs. Within the LF-game, the player assumes the others’ beliefs to be consistent with
his owns: my belief about the next player’s belief about the decision rule of the player
choosing at two nodes distance from here, is consistent with my own belief about this
latter player’s decision rule, and so on. However, beliefs regarding the same player, at
any two different decision nodes, are inconsistent. In level-k it is the other way around.
You can think of it as if, under LBI, the players are split into agents, each choosing at a
different node. Tellingly, this is the same mechanism used to pass from QRE to AQRE. It
captures the characteristic idea33, and the main difference with level-k, that the dynamic
aspect of the game matters: information and actions that are taken at distant nodes are
considered in a different way with respect to those that are close-by. As an implication,
we expect differences in behavior if a game is played in the normal and in the extensive
form, a result which is backed by a number of studies [e.g. Cooper and Van Huyck, 2003]
The different features of LBI with respect to level-k models make the two models best
suited for different situations. We argue that LBI is better suited to address games where
the dynamic aspects are salient. Our experiment provides such an example, showing a
case where LBI succeeds where Level-k fails.
2.4 The Race Game experiment
In all of the previous examples, it is hard to disentangle the impact of limited cognition
from other aspects of decision making, such as other-regarding preferences, reciprocity
or efficiency considerations. To test for LBI, we design a novel experiment featuring a
race game, a sequential, perfect-information game. As it will be clear, this game has nice
features for our scope.
First, it is a zero-sum game, with only two possible outcomes; this implies that we
can overlook all preference-related aspects of the decision problem. Second, each player
has a set of weakly dominant strategies, which mitigates the problem of not observing
the players’ beliefs about others’ strategies. Third, the set of outcomes that is viable
after some history is identical across all histories within the same stage. As, given an
LF-game, this holds true for every pseudo-terminal history, those necessarily feature the
same intermediate payoffs. It follows that the function that projects the terminal payoffs
33If beliefs did not feature this inconsistency, a player horizon would immediately extend to that of his
future self, turning down the assumption of limited foresight.
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on the pseudo-terminal histories is completely irrelevant. Those features make it possible
to observe the pure effect of limited strategic ability, and, in particular, of those limits that
are specific to dynamic strategic settings.
2.4.1 Base Game
In the race game, two players take turns choosing a number of steps, an integer within a
range 1, ...,k. The steps chosen are added up: assuming the players start at position one,
the position at some stage s of the game is given by total number of steps taken in stages
1, ..., s plus one. When a player reaches the target number M, he wins a prize, the other
loses (and gets nothing).
Any race game can be solved backwards: a player easily wins from positions M −
k, ..., M − 1; thus a player choosing at M − (k + 1) is meant to lose. This position can
be reached from M − (2k + 1), ..., M − (k + 2), meaning that a player choosing at M −
2(k + 1) is meant to lose. This reasoning can be iterated back to position one, unveiling a
sequence of losing positions34. An agent that is able to reach with his choice any of these
positions, is able to secure the victory of the game, by reaching the subsequent losing
positions in his following decision nodes.
Formally, the set of losing positions is L = {t ∈ T : t = M − (ik + i), for some i =
1,2, ...}, where T is the ordered set of all positions. The set of winning position is then:
W = T \ L. The game displays a set of (weakly) dominant strategies for both players,
prescribing to reach the closest losing position whenever possible (and choose whatever
number at losing positions). If 1 ∈ L, player 2 has an advantage in the sense that he wins
the game according to any of his dominant strategy. If 1 /∈ L, player 1 has the advantage.
Whenever a player plays an action in a dominated strategy, the advantage transfers to
the other player.
We refer with G(k, M) to the race game with M position and a choice set {1, ..,k}
2.4.2 Previous experiments
The race game has been the object of a series of recent investigations. Dufwenberg et al.
[2010] study the games G(3,21) and G(2,6). The subjects play both games, but the order
in which those games are played is varied. They ask whether solving a simpler game
helps in tackling a similar but more complex one, finding support for this hypothesis.
Gneezy et al. [2010] analyze G(3,15) and G(4,17). They find that subjects switch to
backward analysis as they gain experience. Their understanding of the game proceeds
34We choose the term losing position, following Gneezy et al. [2010]. It comes from the fact that an agent
that chooses there is meant to lose the game, so that an agent reaching a losing position is, actually, winning.
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from the final positions: the losing positions are discovered sequentially, starting from
the one that is closer to the final position.
Levitt et al. [2011] have G(9,100), G(10,100) and a centipede game played by chess
players. Consistently with previous studies, they find the players’ actions to be, on av-
erage, closer to the dominant strategy as the game proceeds. Also, a relatively minor
change in the game - changing k from 9 to 10 - has a major impact on the performance of
the players35. Interestingly, the performance in the race game is strongly correlated to the
players’ ranking as chess players, which is not true with respect to the centipede game36.
This suggests that the race game is able to capture the pure ability to backward induct,
which makes it an ideal set up to test strategic reasoning in sequential games.
2.5 Design
On aggregate, previous results indicate that individuals are unable to figure out their
dominant strategy from the beginning; rather, they discover it as they gain experience,
starting from the actions closer to the end. This observation, despite being consistent
with the LBI hypothesis, leaves open the question of whether the subjects actually reason
only on a limited number of steps ahead of the current decision node and if they do so
consistently with backward induction.
Under limited backward induction, the players solve only a reduced game that in-
cludes the stages that are closer to the current decision node. To identify this behavior
we need to show that the agents (i) reason backward, and (ii) do so on a reduced game
tree. In particular, there are two alternative explanations that we must disentangle from
LBI: under the first, the players perform backward induction from the terminal histo-
ries, but stop the iterative process after some steps37; under the second, behavior is fully
driven by beliefs about the others playing a dominated strategy longer than they do. We
will refer to the former as equilibrium-like behavior and to the latter as confident behavior.
We introduce two modifications to the base game to disentangle LBI behavior.
The trap prize: we add a small prize p at an intermediate position m /∈ L. Winning
p gives your opponent the chance of winning P. Intuitively, p allows indentifying the
reduced game trees that include m as pseudo-terminal histories. Note that p implies
there is no longer a dominant strategy: an agent could try to win both prizes, or only one,
depending on his beliefs about the strategic ability of his opponent. As a consequence,
35In G(9,100) the set of losing positions is L = {10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90}. It is a focal sequence, and
is easier to see, with respect to that in G(10,100), which is L = {1,12,23,34,45,56,67,78,89}.
36Palacios-Huerta and Volij [2009] report partially different findings with respect to the centipede game.
37Gneezy et al. [2010] seem to favor this interpretation.
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when we observe an agent playing consistently with SPE on the reduced game tree, we
could not distinguish between LBI and confident behavior. We achieve this distinction
with the following device.
Claims: we allow players to claim they are going to win p and P in any position, and
independently of who is moving. One can claim both prizes at the same time; a claim
cannot be withdrawn. The players get no feedback on the claims of their opponent and
those are not affecting their payoff; so the claims are non-strategic. However, one’s own
claims are payoff-relevant: by claiming P (p) at position t an agent gets M− t (m− t), on
top of the prize, in case his claim is realized; otherwise, he gets a fine, F . We use claims
to track what the players are targeting along the game.
We call Lp andWp the set of losing and winning positions on the path to p; L|m ⊆ L
andW|m ⊆W indicate the winning and losing positions toward P, restricted to positions
higher than m. Obviously, one of two players will have an initial advantage to get p. A
generic modified race game will be identified as G(k, M,m, P, p, F).
2.5.1 Parameters and treatments
In accordance to the latter convention, we will denote a game with no trap prize as featur-
ing m= 0 and p= 0. We investigate the games G0(6,66,0,100,0,−15) and G1(6,66,40,100,30,−15).
G0 is just a base game with payoff-relevant claims. The set of losing positions is
L = {3,10,17,24,31,38,45,52,59,66}.
The game displays first mover advantage: in every SPE, player 1 wins P and claims it as
soon as the game starts (t = 1).
The same is true for G1. The set of losing positions on the path to p is
Lp = {5,12,19,26,33,40}.
Player 1 has an advantage to win p, as well. However, in any SPE player 1 wins P and
player 2 wins p. Each player claims victory of his respective prize in the first position
(t = 1).
We run two treatments, T0 and T1, featuring G0 and G1, respectively. Each subject
participated only in one of those treatments (between protocol). Subjects played 8 race
games of the relevant type changing partner and role (Player 1 and Player 2) in every
repetition (perfect strangers matching). T0 is used as a benchmark for actions and claims
related to the large prize P. We let the player take all the time they need to take each
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single action, and we do not impose any time constraint on them, so that their strategic
ability is not biased by time pressure.
2.5.2 Equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium behavior
In any SPE equilibrium of the race game, the player who has the initial advantage wins
P; this holds true both in the base and in the modified game. When a small prize is
available, the player at disadvantage with respect to P, wins p, no matter if he has an
initial advantage toward it or not. Each player claims the prize he is going to win in
equilibrium at the initial position.
A more relaxed version, equilibrium-like behavior, would see the subjects discovering
an equilibrium strategy for the whole game as they play it: they reason backwards from
the terminal histories (of the whole game), but, at the beginning of the game, are not
able to roll this reasoning back to their current decision node38. Until this happens, their
choices are left with no guide; as they get to a subgame they can solve, their strategy will
switch to equilibrium. In the base game, this behavior is not distinguishable from LBI.
However, contrary to LBI, those players do not restrict their strategic reasoning based
on the closeness of decision nodes. As we introduce the small prize, p, reasoning on the
LF-game and not on the whole one becomes relevant. For equilibrium-like players, any
subgame represents a smaller race game; thus, when a player solves a subgame, acts
consistent with equilibrium over it. A player who has an advantage in such a subgame
toward P and p, will move to L and win P. He will move to Lp, and win p, only if he
is choosing at a position in L, which would mean the other player could solve a larger
subgame than him, and took advantage of it. Thus, despite allowing for errors in the first
part of the game, under equilibrium-like behavior, we expect errors toward P to fade away
before errors toward p, and P being claimed before p.
As it looks like a natural alternative to LBI, we now consider a dynamic level-k model
for the race game, as in Kawagoe and Takizawa [2012]. Level zero identifies a random
player, normally assumed to be fictitious - i.e. it exists only as a belief in the mind of
the higher-level players. Each level, l, believes the others to be of level l − 1, and best
replies to their actions. Following Ellingsen and Ostling [2010], we assume that a player
observing an action that is inconsistent with his beliefs, revises them assuming the oppo-
nent to be of the highest, among the levels lower than his own, that makes his inference
consistent. Since any action profile is played with positive probability by L0, a player can
always hold a belief that is consistent with the current history. Noting that L0 plays with
38One could frame this as an equilibrium-plus-noise model, with the noise element decreasing, and even-
tually fading away, as the agents get close to the terminal histories.
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positive probability one of his dominant strategies, for k≥ 1, Lk never plays a dominated
strategy. Thus, in the standard race (p = 0) every level should mimic SPE.
When we add p, L1 may try to win both prizes. Intuitively, this happens if the prob-
ability that a random player will pick by chance all t ∈ L|m is sufficiently low39. Thus, if
the distance between the prizes, M − m, and p are relatively large, an L1 player targets
the positions in Lp, switching to those in L|m for t > m. In the other cases, his play mim-
ics SPE. The higher levels play as in SPE, regardless of the parameters, unless they end
up believing their opponent is L0, in which case they mimic L1. The only type that tries
to win both prizes is the less sophisticated one, L1, and he should fail achieving them (as
long as L0 players do not exist). Most notably, the players should pass through all losing
positions, Lp and L.
LBI provides a different perspective. As the players move to higher positions, they
discover new portions of the game tree. If no history corresponding to winning a prize is
included in the LF-game, a player cannot distinguish between any two positions in terms
of chances of winning. As a consequence, the same intermediate payoff is associated to
all pseudo-terminal histories. In the base game, as far as a node corresponding to position
M enter his foresight, he will switch to actions consistent with his dominant strategy - i.e.
try to reach the positions in L. The higher his foresight, the sooner this will happen, the
more chances of winning the player will have. For example, F1 realizes how to win only
when the distance to the prize is lower than k, F2 when it is lower than 2k, and so on. A
player is expected to claim the prize as soon as the positions associated with it fall within
his foresight, and conditional on being at a winning position.
A similar reasoning applies to the modified game. What changes is that position m
falls in the LF-game before M. Thus, the players start targeting Lp before L, and claiming
p before P. This latter feature distinguish behavior consistent with LBI from equilibrium-
like behavior. In both games, the players spend most of the time off the equilibrium path
and converge to losing positions only when a prize is approached.
We next show that we can properly identify LBI behavior in G1 using actions and
claims, also against confident beliefs about the others’ ability. Consider a player that
was not able to solve the whole game from the start (as in equilibrium-like behavior). At
some position t ≤ m, he discovers the solution, reasoning backwards from the terminal
histories. Now he knows how to get p and P. Depending on his belief about the strategic
ability of his opponent, he will either target P or p and then P. In the latter case, we
may misinterpret confident behavior as LBI, while it is driven by the player believing the
probability that his opponent solves the game while t ≤ m to be sufficiently low.
39How to compute this probability depends on the type of randomness assumed for L0. See Kawagoe
and Takizawa [2012] for a discussion of the issue.
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Claims turn out useful here, as we cannot disentangle Confident behavior and LBI
from the actions. We can show that, given our parameters, a Confident player should
claim P as soon as he learns the solution.
Assume that at some t¯, t¯ < m and t¯ ∈ W ∩Wp a player, j, discovers the solution. He
has, basically, three options: target and claim P (S1); target p and P, claim p now and P
only when sure of getting it (S2); target p and P, claim p and P (S3). The payoff from S1 is
pi1 = P + (M− t¯)
The payoff from S2 is
pi2 = p + (m− t¯) + q(P + (M−m− kopp,m))
where q is the probability that the opponent does not solve the game within m and kopp,m
is the action of the opponent at m40. The payoff from S3 is
pi3 = p + (m− t¯) + q(P + (M− t¯)) + (1− q)F
We show that there is no belief that sustains S2 with our parameters, so that S2-
consistent behavior (acting towards p and claiming only p) can be attributed only to
LBI.
Proposition 2. For a risk neutral agent, S2  S3 and S2  S1 if and only if:
∆P + ∆M
P + ∆M − kopp,m ≤ q ≤
−F
m + kopp,m − t¯− F (2.1)
where ∆P = P− p and ∆M = M−m.
Corollary 1. In G1, for t¯ < 37 there exists no q such that S2  S3 and S2  S1.
This and the following proofs are immediate and are thus omitted. Intuitively, to
choose S2, a player needs to believe he has enough chances of winning P after winning p,
but not that many so as to induce him to claim P immediately. With our parameters, the
above interval for q does not virtually exist: even taking the minimum possible kopp,m,
1, which corresponds to the largest possible interval, such a probability exists only for
t¯ ≥ 37; in this case the interval of beliefs that sustain S2 is q ∈ (0.77,0.79).
The following two propositions regard players displaying constant absolute risk aver-
sion (CARA), and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), respectively. They show that
40More precisely, q is the probability that the opponent, choosing at m, will not reach a position in L (for
whatever reason).
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risk aversion is not a major concern in this context. The reason for this is that S3 is more
risky than S2, but S2 is more risky than S1: as a consequence, for risk averse players, both
the upper and the lower bound of the above interval move in the same direction.
Proposition 3. Consider an agent, whose utility function is U(x) = −e−αx, α > 0, featuring
CARA. Then S2  S3 and S2  S1 if and only if:
1− e−α(∆P+∆M)
1− e−α(P+∆M−kopp,m) ≤ q ≤
1− e−αF
1+ e−α(P+M−t¯) − e−α(P+∆M−kopp,m) − e−αF (2.2)
Now let uis, i ∈ {1,2,3}, s ∈ {g,b}, be the (rescaled) utility of a CRRA agent, when his
strategy is Si, conditional on state s. In case the opponent does not solve the game within
m, s = g; otherwise, s = b. Let ρ be the coefficient of CRRA. Then:
u1g,b = (p + m + ∆P + ∆M − t¯)1−ρ
u2g = (2p + m + ∆P + ∆M − t¯− kopp,m)1−ρ
u2b = (p + m +−t)1−ρ
u3g = (2p + 2m + ∆P + ∆M − 2t¯)1−ρ
u3b = (p + m− t¯ + F)1−ρ
Proposition 4. Consider an agent, whose utility function is U(x) = x
1−ρ
1−ρ , ρ > 0 featuring
CRRA, then S2  S3 and S2  S1 if and only if:
u1g,b − u2b
u2g − u2b
≤ q ≤ u
3
b − u2b
(u2g − u2b)− (u3g − u3b)
(2.3)
Corollary 2. In G1, if an agent is not able to reach m in a single move:
i Under CARA, for α < 0.8 there exists no q such that S2  S3 and S2  S1;
ii Under CRRA, for ρ < 0.5 there exists no q such that S2  S3 and S2  S1.
This implies that, until very close to m, under no reasonable parameter of risk aver-
sion there exists a belief sustaining S241. Moreover, even moving closer to m and admit-
ting higher risk aversion levels, the interval of beliefs that sustain S2 remains virtually
irrelevant.
In Figure 2.5 the bounds of the interval for q, in the case of CARA (circles) and CRRA
(stars), are plotted against the coefficient of (constant or relative) risk aversion. To sustain
41There is no consensus on the estimation of the coefficients of relative and absolute risk aversion. Risk
preferences are also characterized by a large interpersonal variance. However most experimental and field
studies agrees on average coefficients that are below our thresholds [see Harrison and Rutström, 2008].
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Figure 2.5: Risk aversion and beliefs sustaining S2: CARA (red), CRRA (blue)
S2, q must be higher than the solid line, and lower than the dashed line. It is assumed
that t¯ = 36 and kopp,m = 1, giving the interval the highest chances to exist and the largest
magnitude. As shown, for low levels of risk aversion, there exists no belief supporting
S2. For intermediate values, a tiny interval, smaller than 0.06, appears42.
Overall we might confuse LBI and confident behavior for claims only under the fol-
lowing conditions: the claim happens within a limited number of positions, in the neigh-
borhood of m (a); under extremely restrictive beliefs about the strategic ability of the
opponent, corresponding to small range (≤ 0.06) of probabilities for the opponent failing
to solve the game at m around 0.8− 0.9 or above (b); under restrictive beliefs about the
choice of the opponent at m (kopp,m = 1) (c); for very high values of risk aversion (d).
Given the low probability of (a),(b),(c) and (d) occurring at the same time43, we claim
that our interpretation of an S2-consistent strategy as due to LBI, to be sufficiently sound.
Summing up, in equilibrium, we should observe only positions in L and Lp in G1
and no error in either treatment; Level-k agents should mimic this behavior, although
we may observe some players (L1) claiming both prizes. Equilibrium-like players would
42If we let risk aversion grow beyond the bounds in the figure, this interval would eventually shrink.
43There also seems to be a contrast in the required pair of high confidence (b, c) and high risk aversion
(d).
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make errors in the first part of the game, but they will reach L before Lp and claim P
before they claim p. Confident players might invert this ordering with respect to actions,
but not with respect to claims: we might see errors toward P decline later than errors
toward p, but prizes being claimed at the same time.
Under LBI, both claims and actions should display a reverse timing with respect to
equilibrium and equilibrium-like behavior. We say that a player makes a p-error (P-error),
if, choosing at a position in Wp (W), he does not reach a position in Lp (L); that is, if
he does not exploit his advantage toward winning a prize. We state the following main
hypothesis, within T1:
Hypothesis 1. The rate of p-errors decreases earlier than that of P-errors.
Hypothesis 2. Prize p is claimed before prize P.
A rejection of both Hypothesis would suggest equilibrium-like behavior44. A rejec-
tion of Hypothesis 2, but not of Hypothesis 1, would be consistent with confident behavior.
Only LBI is consistent with both Hypothesis not being rejected.
Through repetitions, the subjects are expected to learn the strategic features of the
game (and, eventually, fully solve it). Error rates should then decrease and claims become
more precise.
Comparing T0 and T1, we expect the presence of the trap prize to induce higher P-
error rates in all positions t < m. This conclusion stems from two considerations. First,
a successful targeting of p induces more P-errors, even when compared to random be-
havior. Second, the presence of p makes the game more complex, resulting in a lower
strategic performance of the subjects45.
Hypothesis 3. The rate of P-errors is higher in T1 than in T0.
2.5.3 Procedures
The experiment took place at the EELAB of the University of Milan-Bicocca on June 15th,
2012. The computerized program was developed using Z-tree [Fischbacher, 2007]. The
subject display was as similar as possible to the one used by Gneezy et al. (2010). We
run 4 sessions with 24 subjects per session, for a total of 96 participants, equally split
44Under equilibrium and level-k we should see no errors and immediate claims, so that those behaviors
would be easily, though jointly, detected.
45To the extreme, a subject may adopt a “one-problem-at-a-time” approach, starting to think about P at
m. Tellingly, the working paper version of Gneezy et al. [2010] was titled ”I will cross that bridge when I
come to it”.
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across tratments. Participants were undergraduate students from various disciplines,46
recruited through an announcement on the EELAB website.
Instructions were read aloud (see Appendix A for an English translation of the in-
structions). Participants filled in a control questionnaire to ensure everybody understood
the instructions before starting the experiment.
Sessions took on average 70 minutes, including instructions, control and final ques-
tionnaire phases.
During the experiment subjects earned Experimental Currency Units. At the end
one game was selected at random for each couple and subjects were paid the points
they earned in that game only, according to an exchange rate of 1AC = 10ECU. Average
payment was 11.10AC with a minimum of 2.50AC and a maximum of 25.40AC. Subjects
received an initial endowment of 4AC that could be partially spent to pay fines in case of
bankruptcy during the experiment.
2.6 Results
To facilitate the presentation of the results, we partition the set of positions into intervals.
Each interval is formed by all the positions within two losing positions, excluding the
lower and including the upper bound. In T1, we have a similar partition for the small
prize, p, over positions 1, ...,40. Given that the sets L and Lp are disjoint, the intervals for
P and p do not perfectly overlap47 and should be kept distinguished. If not differently
specified, intervals should be understood with reference to the prize they are specific for.
2.6.1 Errors
We start by tracking P- and p-errors over intervals. Figure 2.6 reports the rate of errors
in the two treatments and for both prizes, distinguishing between repetitions 1-4 (a) and
5-8 (b). It represents the fraction of the subjects that did not reach the upper bound of
the interval. Choices taken at L and Lp are excluded from the computation of P- and
p-errors, respectively, since, by definition, there is no correct action available at those
positions. Note that the simple possibility to make two different kinds of error, in T1, is
not sufficient to inflate the rate of errors, since an action that reaches L (Lp) counts as a
p-error (P-error), only if it is not taken at a position in Lp (L).
46Sociology, economics, business, psychology, statistics, computer science, law, biology, medicine, math-
ematics, pedagogy and engineering.
47In particular, the upper bound of an interval that refers to P is two positions lower that the correspond-
ing interval that refers to p.
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Figure 2.6: Error rates over intervals: first (a) and last (b) four repetitions
In the first repetitions, the rate of P-errors follows a similar pace in T0 and T1, though
it is slightly higher in the latter between interval 3 and 7. Around eighty percent48 of the
subjects choosing at winning positions makes an error in the first interval. This percent-
age decreases slightly in T0, reaching 60 percent at interval 8. It remains more or less
stable in T1 until it drops sharply after interval 7. The rate of p-errors starts above 90
percent, it drops then significantly, reaching 45 percent in interval 5. In the last four rep-
etitions, the performance of the subjects improves significantly in T0, though it remains
above 40 percent until interval 7. In T1 the rate of P-errors is unchanged, with respect to
the first repetitions, until interval 7, after which is substantially lower. The performance
with respect to prize p shows a relevant improvement.
A more precise measure of the moment where a subject understands the solution of
the game is to identify the last interval where he makes an error. It should be noted
that when an agent stops making errors, we cannot register any error on the part of his
opponent. As a consequence the last errors we record and their distribution should be
understood as a lower bound for the real ones.
Figure 2.7 shows the average last error for each repetition. As before, the perfor-
mance improves sharply in T0, passing from above the sixth to below the fourth inter-
val. Starting from a similar level in the first repetition, the improvement is smaller in
T1. Spearman’s rank correlation confirms the reduction in last errors is significant for all
treatments and prizes (T0, P: ρ = −0.34, P-val < 0.01; T1, P: ρ = −0.20, P-val < 0.01; T1,
p: ρ = −0.24, P-val < 0.01). The average last p-error is consistently below the average
last P-error in T1, with a difference of up to three intervals.
48An agent choosing at random makes an error 83 percent of the time.
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Figure 2.7: Average last error over repetitions: T0 (a) and T1 (b)
Figure 2.8: Distribution of last errors: first (top) and last (bottom) four repetitions
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Figure 2.8 reports the distributions of the last errors, by treatment and for the first
and last repetitions. The distributions for prize P are bimodal. A fraction of the subjects
does not make any error, or do so only in the first interval. The rest of the population
stops making errors only close to the final position. Those, who constitute a majority of
the population, display a bell shaped distribution, peaking around intervals six, seven
and eight. We build the same distributions restricting to those who claimed the prize for
which the last error is recorded. The distributions shift slightly toward lower intervals,
without affecting the general picture.
We reject the null of an equal distribution of last P-errors between T0 and T1 using a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test (KST), both for the raw distributions (D = 0.2188,
P-val = 0.00) and for those restricted to the claiming subjects (D = 0.2114, P-val = 0.00).
A Mann-Whitney rank sum test (MWRST) confirms this result: the distributions of P-
errors are different in the two treatments (z = −2.766, P-val = 0.00). Indeed the fraction
of subjects not making errors is apparently higher in T0. Moreover, the learning effect is
much higher: around 40 percent of the subjects show a perfect play in the last repetitions
of T049. We observe smaller differences across repetitions in T1, concentrated in the right-
hand side of the distributions.
The distribution of the last p-errors shows again a majority of the subjects making
the last error less than three intervals before the prize. We observe only a tiny fraction of
players not making any p-error. Within T1, improvements in understanding how to win
p capture most of the learning effect.
Given that, in T1, a player can make a P-error even if he understood how to win P, in
case he was aiming at winning both prizes, we check if the differences across treatments
are due to this effect. In case a subject claimed both prizes50 and won prize p, without
making any P-error after that, we attribute to him a last P-error equal to his last p-error.
Despite we do observe a better performance in the adjusted with respect to the base
distributions, the effect is minor and does not affect the difference with respect to T0
(KST: D = 0.1458, P-val < 0.01; MWRST: z =−1.873, P-val = 0.06). Overall, the evidence
supports Hypothesis 3.
That most subjects make the last P-error after they make their last p-error is apparent
in Figure 2.9, where we plot the distribution of the difference between the two types of
errors, for each individual. The supports of the distributions are different, as prize p is
earned before P. However, recall, from Section 2.5.2, that the last P-error should happen
before the last p-error under equilibrium-like behavior and that no error should arise
49Recall that when a player does not make any error, we cannot register any error for his opponent as
well.
50Recall the discussion in section 2.5.2.
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of differences between the last P-error and last p-error
under equilibrium and level-k.
We test for the difference in the distributions of P- and p- errors using Wilcoxon
singed-rank test (WSRT). Given that the implied assumption of symmetry for the dis-
tribution of P-errors may be problematic, we complement this test with the sign test.
Both tests reject the null that the median of the distribution in Figure 2.9 is zero: WSRT:
z = 11.723, P-val < 0.01; ST (Ha: Last P - Last p > 0): P-val < 0.01; ST (Ha: Last P - Last p
< 0): P-val = 1.00, P-val < 0.01; ST (Ha: Last P - Last p 6= 0): P-val < 0.01. The same con-
clusions hold for the adjusted distributions. Thus, we find strong evidence supporting
Hypothesis 1.
Our results are highly consistent with previous investigations. Despite a number of
subjects play (or learn to play) close to equilibrium, most of them find it difficult to solve
the game backwards, even after gaining significant experience. In the early intervals,
their actions cannot be distinguished from random play. A majority of the subjects dis-
cover how to win a prize only when they are at a distance of at most three intervals from
it.
The subjects manage to reach the positions in Lp before those in L. To check whether
this behavior is due to LBI reasoning we analyze claiming behavior.
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2.6.2 Claims
Figure 2.10: Distribution of claims: first (top) and last (bottom) four repetitions
The subjects made a wide use of the claiming device. Around 65 and 67 percent of
the subjects claimed they would have won prize P in T0 and T1, respectively; 60 percent
claimed prize p in T1. Some claims were unwarranted, and, indeed, a fine was imposed
on 29 percent of both the p-claims and the P-claims; thus, most claims ended with the
claiming player winning the prize.
Figure 2.10 displays the distribution of claims over intervals; the upper and the lower
panels display results for repetitions 1-4 and 5-8, respectively, for T0 (left) and T1 (right).
The distributions of P-claims tracks the pace of that of last errors, separated between
early (interval 1-2) and late claimers (intervals 7-9).
With respect to last errors, the proportion between the early and late claimers shifts
in favor of the former. This tendency to bet on one’s ability to solve the game before
the opponent is documented in Figure 2.11: some players claim a prize before they make
their last error, in both treatments. However, a majority of the claims happen at a distance
of less than one interval from the last error. The value of minus one corresponds to
claiming in the interval that follows that of the last error, and is modal in both treatments.
On aggregate we reject that the median value of this distribution is, indeed, different from
this value (WSRT: z =−1.54, P-val = 0.13.). Thus, despite confident behavior plays a role,
our interpretation of claims as a marker of what a subject is targeting appears robust.
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Figure 2.11: Distribution of differences between the timing of the last error and that of
the claim
The comparisons between the prizes that we made for errors, holds basically un-
changed for the claims. In particular, the distribution of p-claims is first order stochasti-
cally dominant with respect to that of P-claims. Thus, the players claimed prize p before
prize P: our tests reject that the distributions of p- and P-claims are equal: WSRT: z= 9.44,
P-val < 0.01; ST (Ha: Last P - Last p > 0): P-val < 0.01; ST (Ha: Last P - Last p < 0): P-val
= 1.00, P-val < 0.01; ST (Ha: Last P - Last p 6= 0): P-val < 0.01.
Across treatments, we find somewhat less significant differences in claiming behavior
(KST: D = 0.1099, P-val = 0.08; MWRST: z = −1.307, P-val = 0.19).
Given the previous remarks, we look at claims that are perfect, in the sense that the
player does not make any error after he claims. As with the last errors, we correct for the
possibility that a player makes an error consciously, as he thinks he can win both prizes:
in T1, we take a P-claim to be perfect if an agent claim both prizes, does not make any p-
error after claiming P and does not make any P-error after winning p. Figure 2.12 shows
the fraction of those claims on the total for each interval; the two upper panels regard P-
claims in T0 (left) and T1 (right), the lower panel regards p-claims. Late claims are more
likely to be perfect: in the three intervals prior to a prize, virtually all claims are perfect.
This fraction drops significantly if we move further form the prize, and particularly so
for p-claims. Our tests on the obtained distributions show identical results51.
51P-claims vs p-claims: WSRT: z = 8.77, P-val < 0.01; ST (Ha: Last P - Last p > 0): P-val < 0.01; ST (Ha:
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Figure 2.12: Fraction of claims that are perfect, over repetitions
Overall, the evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 2: prize p is claimed before prize
P. Combined with the analysis mad for errors, we find support for all the Hypothesis
derived from LBI.
We close this section with some insights from the timing of the decisions of the sub-
jects.
2.6.3 Timing
We wanted the players to take the time they needed to reason and reach a decision with-
out the pressure of time constraints. We then analyze how the subjects used their time.
Figure 2.13 displays the average number of seconds the agents took to choose how
many steps to take. The two panels refers to T0 (left) and T1 (right). Different averages
are computed for winning and losing positions, so that we observe, for T0, the mean for
L andW , and for T1, the mean for L, Lp andW ∩Wp.
In the first repetition the averages are indistinguishable and around twenty seconds
for each decision. The time for each choice drops progressively through repetitions only
Last P - Last p < 0): P-val = 1.00, P-val < 0.01; ST (Ha: Last P - Last p 6= 0): P-val < 0.01. P-claims, T0 vs T1:
KST: D = 0.1265, P-val = 0.11; MWRST: z = −0.987, P-val = 0.32.
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Figure 2.13: Average time for each decision over repetitions
in the case of winning positions, so that deciding at losing positions takes relatively more
time with respect to winning positions as the game is repeated; this result is consistent
with the evidence in Gneezy et al. [2010]. Decisions take longer in T1 than in T0, except
for the first repetitions. This could be due to the higher complexity of the modified game.
We note that most of the difference between losing and winning positions, for all
prizes and treatments, comes from the choices at the two losing positions located at two
and three steps from the prize. This seems to suggest that the subjects put more effort in
reasoning when they get close to a prize.
Equilibrium reasoning seems to imply that all the strategic effort is made at the be-
ginning of the game, after which players just follow the planned strategy. Indeed, this
holds true for any theory that does not target specifically the dynamic structure of the
game. It is not clear what equilibrium-like imply in terms of the timing of decisions. As
the game is solved, the effort in taking a decision should drop. Before that time, the sub-
jects are reasoning on far away nodes, trying to roll back their reasoning to their decision
node. If anything, their effort should be higher the further they are from the end. Most
importantly, no special effort should be exerted around the small prize, as the subjects
are reasoning on the whole game, from the terminal histories.
On the other hand LBI predicts a different pace. At the beginning of the game, the
LF-game provides no information on how to choose a meaningful action, as the proba-
bility of winning seems unaffected by the current choice (without conditioning on future
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Figure 2.14: Average time for each decision over positions
choices): until a prize falls in the LF-game, all intermediate values are the same, so that,
actually, there seems to be nothing to think about. As there is no scope for in-depth con-
sideration of different alternatives, the players choose basically at random52. As soon
as a prize is included in the LF-game, it becomes worth reasoning on which action to
pick. Thus we expect an increase in the time needed to reach a decision as the players
get close to p in T1. A long time should be needed also when close to P, in both treat-
ments. Whether the effort decreases between the two prizes will depend on the depth of
the players’ strategic reasoning.
We can contrast those predictions with Figure 2.14, where the average number of
seconds per decision is plotted against the set of positions, for both treatments. In T0,
the graph remains flat, at around ten seconds, until position 40; it then shows a steep
increase, reaching thirty seconds around 50, followed by a symmetric drop, and is back
to around ten seconds by 60. T1 displays an identical pace after 40. However it shows
another steep increase, followed by a symmetric drop, between positions 20 and 40. It
is clear from the figure that both the magnitude and the length of both the early and the
52Recall that, indeed, the error rate in the first intervals are very close to those obtained by fully random
players.
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late raise, in the effort made to take a decision, are similar, if not identical.
This behavior perfectly match what predicted under LBI, and is at odds with the
other predictions. It seems that prizes are included in the LF-game, on average, at two or
three intervals of distance from each prize, a measure that is perfectly consistent with the
figures shown for errors and claims.
Overall we find evidence in favor of every single hypothesis derived from LBI. Most
players put effort in deciding only when a prize approaches. As a consequence the error
rate for the small prize declines before that of the large prize and the former is claimed
before the latter, on average. We also find evidence of some equilibrium players and of
learning towards equilibrium play (in T0). There seems to exist a huge divide between
those latter players and the rest. This is proven also by the answers given to a ques-
tionnaire we provided at the end of the experiment, including some questions about the
chosen strategy. Around fifteen percent of the subjects identified the full set of losing
positions as the guide for their strategy. Half of the subjects stated as “strategic” only
a subset of the last three losing positions and around one third clearly stated they were
trying to move as quickly as possible to the “hot-spots”, close to the prizes.
2.7 Conclusion
The paper presents a general framework of out-of-equilibrium behavior in sequential
games, limited backward induction, including a novel experiment aimed at testing its
predictions.
Under LBI, the agents take decisions according to backward induction over restricted
decision trees, the LF-game, the dimension of which is determined by the level of fore-
sight of the players. The framework is flexible and applies to all sequential games with
perfect information, including infinite games. As we let the level of foresight grow, in the
limit, LBI mimic subgame perfection. On the other side, it encompasses perfect myopia
as a special case.
We test the model using an experiment based on the race game, which, in our view,
is the best setting to study strategic thinking in sequential games. A small trap prize, off
the equilibrium path, and the possibility to claim prizes, allow us to gather a number of
new insights. As already noted by Gneezy et al. [2010], we find that backward reasoning
is the main cognitive procedure used by the subjects. However this procedure does not
proceed backwards from the terminal histories, but is rather routinely performed on the
few stages that are closer to the current decision node, as predicted by LBI.
We find support for every single hypothesis derived from LBI, while all other models,
including equilibrium and level-k, fail. Effort in decision making increases only when a
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prize is approached. The path to the trap prize is discovered and pursued before that to
the final prize. The trap prize keeps the subjects off the equilibrium prize longer than in
the base game.
Beyond its clear success in this experiment, LBI can explain aggregate behavior in
other contexts, such as, for example, the centipede game, and sequential bargaining.
LBI type of reasoning bares important messages for real life decisions that include
planning or anticipating the choices of other people in the future. First, the longer the
chain of backward reasoning needed to reach the optimal solution, the more likely errors
are and the more experience is needed to reach it. Second, a myopic bias may emerge
in situations where individual plans involve choices that have different consequences
at different points in time. This may be misunderstood as stemming from low discount
factors, despite being due only to limited strategic thinking. These remarks have relevant
consequences in many applications, such as, for example, retirement decisions and asset
bubbles.
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome to this experiment in decision-making. You will receive 3 Euros as a show-up
fee. Please, read carefully thesse instructions. The amount of money you earn depends
on the decisions you and other participants make. In the experiment you will earn ECU
(Experimental Currency Units). At the end of the experiment we will convert the ECU
you have earned into euros according to the rate: 1 Euro = 10 ECU. You will be paid your
earnings privately and confidentially after the experiment. Throughout the experiment
you are not allowed to communicate with other participants in any way. If you have
a question please raise your hand. One of us will come to your desk to answer it.
[Between square brackets, we report the instructions specific to T1]
The game
• You will play a game with two players, P and Q.
• The players decide sequentially: they will take turns, one after the other. Each
decision consists in a number of steps, between 1 and 6 (included).
• You will start at position 1. P is the first to decide.
• At the beginning, P chooses a number of steps between 1 and 6. Summed to the
initial position, those steps determine a new position (example: P chooses 3; new
position = 1+3 = 4).
• Then Q chooses a number between 1 and 6. those are summed to the position
reached by P (example, follows: B chooses 5; new position = 4 + 5 = 9). And so
on.
• The game ends when one of the players reaches position 66 with his decision.
• The players are always informed of the current position.
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Prizes
• [When a player reaches position 40 with his choice, he obtains the prize A,
valued 30 ECU].
• When a player reaches position 66 with his choice, he obtains the prize [B], valued
100 ECU.
• At any time you can claim you are going to win the prize [A or the prize B; you are
allowed to claim both prizes].
• If a player obtains the prize he has claimed, he earns, on top of the prize, a number
of ECU equal to the difference between 66 [the position of the prize] and the posi-
tion where he has declared to win it (example: P declares at position 60 he is going
to win the prize, and then wins; he receives 6 ECU on top of the prize [P declares at
position 35 he is going to win prize A, and then wins; he receives 5 ECU on top of
the prize]).
• If a player does not win a prize he has claimed, he gets a fine worth 20 ECU.
• When a player declares he is going to win [a prize], his opponent is not informes
and can himself declare he is winning [the same prize].
• The number of ECU earned are the sum of the prize[s] and the adjunctive ECU
obtained, minus the fine[s].
Structure of the experiment
• You will play 8 rounds of this game.
• You will play alternatively as player P and Q; this means you will choose alterna-
tively as first and second.
• In every new round you will play agianst a new partner, chosen at random between
the other participants.
• You will never play twice with the same partner.
• Two of your opponents will never play one against the other.
Earnings
• Only one out of the eight rounds will be paid to you.
• At the end of the experiment, one number between 1 and 8 will be selected at ran-
dom by the computer, and the corresponding game will be paid.
• You will be informed of the chosen game, of your final payoff in ECU and of the
corrosponding Euro.
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Concluding remarks
You have reached the end of the instructions. It is important that you understand them.
If anything is unclear to you or if you have questions, please raise your hand. To ensure
that you understood the instructions we ask you to answer a few control questions. After
everyone has answered these control questions correctly the experiment will start.
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CHAPTER 3
AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION
AND REPRESENTATION EFFECTS IN
THE CENTIPEDE GAME1
Abstract
The paper presents the results of a novel experiment testing the effects of environment
complexity on strategic behavior, using a centipede game.
Behavior in the centipede game has been explained either by appealing to failures
of backward induction or by calling for preferences that induce equilibria consistent
with observed behavior. By manipulating the way in which information is provided
to subjects we show that reduced availability of information is sufficient to shift the
distribution of take nodes further from the equilibrium prediction. Similar results are
obtained under two different manipulations.
Our results show that cognitive limitations play a relevant role in determining (shifts
in) behavior in the centipede game. Furthermore our results are at odds with the re-
cent findings in Cox and James [2012], suggesting caution in generalizing their results.
Reducing the availability of information may hamper backward induction or induce
myopic behavior, depending on the strategic environment. Both effects can be ratio-
nalized in terms of limited forward-looking behavior.
JEL classification: C72, C73, C91
Keywords: Centipede; Backward Induction; Representation Effects.
1Joint work with Paolo Crosetto (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena)
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3.1 Introduction
The effects on observed behavior of apparently superficial changes in presentation are
generally referred to as framing effects. Their existence2 suggests that the game agents
play is hardly ever identical to the canonical representation assumed by the experimenter.
There are two layers of the subject’s representation that can be affected by those changes:
in some cases, an institutional format may elicit preferences that another does not; in
others, the institutional format affects the players’ understanding of the structure of the
game. In terms of extensive form games, utilities only are affected in the former case,
the game form and, as a consequence, utilities in the latter. Obviously, both mechanisms
may be at work at the same time.
We perform two institutional manipulations on the centipede game to gather insights
on the commonly observed patterns of behavior in this game. In particular, by manip-
ulating the presentation of information about payoffs, we achieve two variations on the
standard game, which we use to identify if and how cognitive factors are effective in shift-
ing aggregate behavior in the game. As our manipulated institutional formats are more
complex than the standard format, we can isolate the effects on behavior of (marginal)
increases in complexity in a simple sequential game.
The centipede game [Rosenthal, 1981] has attracted experimental investigation mainly
due to its counterintuitive theoretical prediction. The original centipede game is a two-
player, finite sequential game in which the subjects alternate choosing whether to end
the game (“take”) or to pass to the other player (“pass”). The payoff from taking in the
current decision node is greater than that received in case the other player takes in the
next one, but less than the payoff earned if the other player were to pass as well. The
player making the final choice is paid more from taking than from passing, and would
therefore be expected to take. Iterating this argument, backward induction leads to the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium: the game is stopped at the first decision node.
Starting from the first experimental evidence [Fey et al., 1996; McKelvey and Palfrey,
1992], a huge amount of studies have found that players fail to comply with this extreme
unraveling prediction, even after a number of repetitions.
Probably due to the combination of the simplest possible sequential structure, a clear-
cut equilibrium prediction, and a still rich and subtle strategic environment, the cen-
tipede has become a workhorse for theory testing. As simple as it may seem, the iden-
tification of the motivations underlying behavior in the centipede turns out to be a chal-
lenging task. The list of possible reasons why players may take actions that diverge from
2See, in general, Tversky and Kahneman [1981]; for an application to games, see Devetag and Warglien
[2003]; Kreps [1990].
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subgame perfect equilibrium turns out to be long and often twisted.3 Broadly speak-
ing, we can identify different families of explanations regarding the roots of deviations
from equilibrium, depending on whether they rely on preferences [e.g., Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2004], on bounded strategic thinking [e.g., Kawagoe and Takizawa, 2012;
Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2009]4 or on a combination of the two [e.g., Maniadis, 2011;
McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Zauner, 1999].5
In a recent paper, Cox and James [2012] found that a strategically irrelevant manip-
ulation of the institutional format by which two, otherwise identical, centipede games
are represented can have a significant impact on behavior. In particular, they found that
framing the game as a sequential auction, where the players are informed about the pay-
offs if buying in the current node but have to compute the payoffs for future stages by
themselves, triggers an unprecedented proportion of behavior observationally equiva-
lent to subgame perfect strategies. They interpret this finding as an instance of myopia
arising from making information about the game less available.
Another way to reduce the availability of information in the centipede game exploits
the fact that payoffs are additively separable, in the sense that they can be represented
as a stream of payoffs - positive and negative - arising at every decision node. In other
words, each “pass” entails a loss for the passing player and a (higher) gain for the other,
while “take” implies ending the game with the payoffs cumulated up to that node.
We exploit the two abovementioned institutional formats to investigate the role of
cognitive limitations in shaping taking behavior in the centipede game. In our baseline
standard treatment (Tree), the players are shown the standard game tree displaying the
final payoffs at every terminal history. The first manipulation (Formula) traces the Clock
treatment in Cox and James [2012]: the players are informed only about the progression
of the payoffs throughout the game; as they proceed they are told the final payoffs were
the game to end at that node, but have to compute the final payoffs for future decision
nodes (if they so wish). Under the second manipulation (Decomposed), the payoffs are de-
composed in stage payoffs as described above. To compute the final payoffs, the players
need to sum up the stage payoffs to each terminal history. As before, they are informed
about the final payoffs, were the game to end at the current node. The final payoffs, the
rules of the game and their description, together with all other details of the design are
identical across treatments, and exactly the same amount of information is available to
3Levitt et al. [2011] provide a nice example of such a list. A partial attempt to disentangle those reasons
can be found in Atiker et al. [2011].
4This category actually includes departures from common knowledge of rationality (or incorrect beliefs)
and correct beliefs with imperfect best reply.
5Other relevant papers featuring theoretical and experimental analyses on the centipede are Nagel and
Tang [1998]; Ponti [1996]; Rapoport et al. [2003].
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the players, although presented in a different way.
Following Cox and James [2012], Formula could elicit myopia due to information be-
ing less available: facing some higher complexity, the players would focus only on the
closest decision nodes and not consider the possible gains from passing. Note however
that, in principle, the more complex environment could trigger an opposite effect: a
player could find it harder (or more costly) to perform backward induction and pass
through more nodes as he fails longer to recognize the strategic structure of the game.
Those considerations apply as well to treatment Decomposed.
With respect to the base treatment, both institutional transformations achieve later
take nodes, which are further away from the theoretical prediction: apparently, making
information less available makes it more difficult for subjects to understand the strategic
structure of the game,6 with no evidence of myopia. We observed no difference between
the Formula and the Decomposed condition. However, the Decomposed condition is both
preference non-neutral, and turned out to be perceived as more complex than Formula,
making it difficult to compare the results7.
More notably, the first result is sharply at odds with results in Cox and James [2012]:
although we perform the same manipulation, our subjects take later where theirs take
earlier. We interpret this gap as stemming from relevant differences in the base game:
their centipede is extremely competitive and already complex in the tree format, whereas
ours is a more standard, less competitive and simple game. A reduction in the availabil-
ity of information induces, in the former environment, no use of the information about
distant nodes, resulting in myopic early takes, and only hampers backward induction
(or reduced use of the information about distant nodes), in turn resulting in late takes,
in the latter. We show how this apparent conflict can be reconciled in the framework of
the limited backward induction model presented in Chapter 2. More generally, our re-
sults suggest cautiousness about generalizations of the effects of complexity on strategic
behavior and elicits new fascinating research questions on the topic.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the experimental
design and present our main hypotheses. The actual implementation of the design in the
lab is detailed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes the results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
6Or, change the beliefs about the others’ ability to understand the strategic structure of the game.
7See the discussion in Section 3.4.4.
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3.2 Experimental Design
3.2.1 Treatments
We implement a twelve-legged centipede, with actions labeled “Stop” and “Continue”.
Terminal histories are ordered and assigned a number between 1 and 13 (Stop at first
node: 1; ... ; Always continue: 13). The aggregate payoff at each terminal history is
worth 5 times the corresponding number; the player choosing “Stop” gathers 45 of the
total value, while the opponent gathers the remaining 15 (see Fig. 3.1).
The length and the linear increase in the joint payoffs distinguish our game from the
most exploited experimental centipedes.
The length of the game is meant to allow for responses to relatively minor treatment
variations to emerge and to enhance the relevance of sequential reasoning.
We chose an arithmetic progression with respect to the more common, geometric one
[as in McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992] for two main reasons. The first, specific to our design,
is that a linear increase (as a function of the decision node) makes the underlying formula
easy to convey also to subjects with potentially low numeracy skills.8 The second, more
general, is to avoid the unpleasant choice the experimenter faces with geometric cen-
tipedes between a very short game, an exchange rate that makes initial payoffs econom-
ically irrelevant, or a geometric factor that makes the progression at first nodes virtually
flat.910 In our setting, it is possible to keep the range of payoffs in line with the literature
while providing economic relevance to choices at all decision nodes, including the first
ones. Our choice allows us to show payoffs directly in euro, with the first decision node
entailing a payoff of (4,1) euro for the player controlling the node and the opponent, re-
spectively, and a payoff of (52,13) euro if both players choose “Continue” at all decision
nodes.
In this general framework, we implement three different ways of conveying the pay-
off information:
8A pilot featuring a geometric progression was run, but proper understanding of the treatment “For-
mula” proved difficult, undermining the comparability of the results. All data and materials are available
upon request.
9Rapoport et al. [2003] avoid the problem for a limited number of subjects in their “high stakes” treat-
ment, bearing the risk of a potentially explosive budget. More commonly, the increase in payoffs at the first
decision nodes is in terms of cents.
10Our progression keeps constant the absolute increase of the pie and the absolute gains a player may
get by abstaining from taking for one more decision; a geometric progression keeps constant the relative
increase of the pie and the relative gains a player may get by abstaining from taking for one more decision.
As behavior is likely to be sensible to those features, there may be reasons to choose a geometric progression,
in some contexts. Those, however, are hardly made explicit in the literature.
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Figure 3.1: The game representation in the Tree condition, payoffs in euro
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Figure 3.2: The game representation in the Decomposed condition, payoffs in euro
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Tree: as is standard in the literature, subjects are shown the game tree that reports at
each terminal history the final payoffs accruing to both players. The tree, as shown
to subjects, can be seen in Figure 3.1. This condition replicates the standard way11 to
convey the centipede game in experiments.
Formula: the subjects are not shown the tree but only the formula to compute the pay-
offs. In particular, subjects are told that, when one player chooses “Stop”, she earns
four times the number of the current decision node, while the other earns an amount
equal to the number of the decision node.
Decomposed: the subjects are shown the game tree, but, instead of final payoffs, the
stage-payoffs – i.e. the variations with respect to the currently earned payoff – are
shown for each decision node. The tree, as shown to the subjects of the Decomposed
condition, can be seen in Figure 3.2.
Thus the Tree and the Decomposed conditions conveyed information using a compre-
hensive visual representation of the game.12 In the Formula condition, all information
was conveyed by means of words13.
It should be noted that the players were given exactly the same amount of information
under all treatment conditions, the only difference being its availability: in the Formula
and Decomposed conditions, players have to compute endgame payoffs for future stages
on their own. Given our payoffs, this step is, however, minimally demanding: it requires
the computation of the four-times table or of simple integer sums, respectively.
The proposed game is the same in all treatments and the presentation variations are
minimal. These features may trigger experimenter demand effects [see Zizzo, 2010], and
unintended spillovers across representations. Combined with the well-known learning
dynamics in the centipede game, we opted for a pure between subjects design.14
Within each experiment, subjects repeated the game 12 times in a perfect stranger
matching, implemented by using the turnpike protocol. This matching allows us to as-
sure subjects that they will never play the same partner twice, and that their partners
11In particular, the figure is identical to that in Palacios-Huerta and Volij [2009] and Levitt et al. [2011].
12The subjects, identified by color, were shown the full length of the tree and (final or stage) payoffs at
each node. Moreover, every decision node was numbered and intuitively assigned to a player/color. The
images in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 were both given to the subjects in a printed version as part of their instructions
and presented on screen at every decision node; in the screen version, the red arrow would move to indicate
the current decision node; moreover, all past decision nodes would gray out on screen. Both active and
inactive players were shown the same set of pictures, the difference being that the inactive player faced no
choice but was reminded of the choice that the matched player was considering at that moment.
13The part of the screen regarding the current decision node was identical to the Tree condition; with
respect to the latter, a description of the rules of the game (including the formulas to compute the payoffs)
took the place of the visual representation.
14We introduce several controls that allow us to check whether a set of relevant subject characteristics
(age, gender, risk and trust attitudes) showed any particular bias across treatments.
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will never play one another, thus ensuring absence of contagion effects. Repetitions were
meant to allow the subjects to gain experience. We also chose to keep the roles fixed
across repetitions to restrict the confounding effects of identification.
3.2.2 Hypothesis
In the following we formulate our main hypothesis, regarding the effect of the availability
of information, and thus comparing the Formula and Decomposed conditions to the Tree
condition.
Despite there have been proposed many and quite different explanations of the stan-
dard results in the centipede game, under all of them the reason for passing can be
tracked, in one way or the other, to the high payoffs that arise if the game is continued15.
If a subject passes at some decision node in a standard centipede, envisaging higher pay-
offs, it is necessary that he thinks that those payoffs are achievable - i.e. that his partner
will pass as well until then - implying he is not using backward induction in the standard
way.
Reducing the availability of information, by making the game more complex, may
influence the way in which the subjects use information over payoffs in the continuation
game. Broadly speaking, a higher cost of information, will reduce its use. We show how
this could result, in principle, in opposite shifts in behavior, using the Limited Backward
Induction (LBI) model, presented in Chapter 216.
If the cost of using information is sufficiently high, the subject would be induced to
cease using - i.e. disregard - all information regarding some (distant) nodes. This, in
turns, would trigger myopic behavior, as the player focus only on immediate nodes and
the respective payoffs. To picture this, imagine Figure 3.1 covered with a blank paper
that leaves visible only the first decision nodes. The players would be facing a shorter
centipede game, which is likely to produce actions consistent with subgame perfect equi-
librium strategies. In the terminology of LBI this would account as a reduction in the sight
of the players, following more limited availability of information. As mentioned in the
Introduction, Cox and James [2012] interpret their results along these lines.
Hypothesis 1.1. In conditions Formula and Decomposed, the subjects choose “Stop” ear-
lier than in the Tree condition.
15The high payoffs may induce passing for different reasons. To cite a few: efficiency considerations,
preferences for reciprocity, beliefs over altruistic types, failure to recognize the strategic structure of the
game.
16LBI is useful to clarify the hypothesis and provide an interpretation. Our design, however, tackles the
issue in a more general way; our conclusions, as a consequence, will also be more general. On the other
hand, our design is not suited for testing the model.
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Under a milder reaction, the player would make a more coarsed use of the informa-
tion on the payoffs arising at distant nodes, though not disregarding them. LBI assumes
that players project distant payoffs over some closer decision node, and reasons back-
wards from there. The projection is normally assumed to be the average between the
minimum and the maximum of the projected payoffs.
To picture this, in the covering paper example, imagine that, instead of being blank,
the paper reports, after the last decision node that is visible, this projection of the future
payoffs. Enhanced complexity, by reducing the foresight of the player – i.e. the number of
close-by nodes that are considered under backward induction – will induce to aggregate
the payoffs of a larger number of nodes in a single statistic: the covering paper moves
toward the first decision node. More payoffs being aggregated means, intuitively, that
more of the efficiency gains are captured in the projection (and not strategically scruti-
nized); this, in turns, makes it more likely for a player to expect a “pass” at the following
decision nodes. Thus, reduced availability of information, to the extent that it induces
a reduction in its use, but not a break, may hamper backward induction, resulting in
passing longer through the game17.
Hypothesis 1.2. In conditions Formula and Decomposed, the subjects choose “Stop” later
than in the Tree condition.
3.3 Experimental Procedure
The computerized experiment was run in Jena in June 2012, involving 210 subjects dis-
tributed over 8 experimental sessions. Seventy-two subjects took part in the baseline Tree
sessions; a further 74 subjects participated in the Formula and 64 in the Decomposed con-
ditions. The experiment lasted about 1 hour, and average payoff across all sessions and
conditions amounted to 11.8 euro, including a 2.5 euro show-up fee.
All sessions followed an identical procedure. After subjects were allowed into the
lab, instructions were read aloud and extra time was given to the subjects to go through
them on their own. Then all subjects had to correctly answer a set of control questions
before being allowed to proceed. The number of mistakes recorded in the questions,
and the time needed to clear the control questions screen, were both recorded and used
as an objective measure of the complexity of the treatment. During this phase, subjects
17Our manipulations are close to cognitive load experiments [Cappelletti et al., 2011; Swann, 1990; Shiv
and Fedorikhin, 1999, e.g.] in that we manipulate the level of cognition imposing or not imposing (compu-
tational) burdens on otherwise identical tasks. The hypothesis that reducing the availability of information
may reduce subjects’ strategic ability to reason backwards is consistent with the results in this literature, as
reported by Devetag and Warglien [2003] and Duffy and Smith [2012].
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could – and many did – ask help from the experimenters with going through the control
questions.
After all subjects had cleared their control questions, the experiment started. Subjects
were randomly assigned to their roles (“White” or “Black”), randomly matched, and
proceeded to play the game. The same game was repeated 12 times, in a perfect stranger
matching design. The pairs were allowed to proceed each at their own pace within the
12 decision nodes of the game but had to wait for all the other pairs between repetitions.
After completing the 12th repetition, subjects were paid according to the results of a
randomly drawn repetition, and were asked to fill in a questionnaire. We gathered qual-
itative information about the expectations from the game and the opponent, the strategy
followed, and the belief on the opponent’s behavior. Moreover, we elicited self-reported
quantitative measures of trust and risk aversion [using the SOEP German Panel trust
and risk questions. For the risk question, see Dohmen et al., 2011] and of the perceived
complexity of the task.
The experiment was conducted in German. The English version of the experimental
instructions is available in Appendix B.18
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Controls
Given the between subjects design, we check whether randomization resulted in any
significant composition bias across treatments. Moreover, the questionnaire answers and
the statistics gathered on the control questions allow us to see if and to what extent the
treatment manipulations achieved the desired effects - i.e. enhanced complexity. This
section addresses these issues.
First, treatments did not differ for all the characteristics that we controlled for (age,
gender, attitudes toward risk and trust). Treatments did not differ in terms of trust
(Wilkoxon rank-sum test - WRST, all p-values > 0.12) and risk attitudes (WRST, all p-
values > 0.08) of the subjects involved. The composition of the treatment also did not
differ statistically by gender (WRST, all p-values > 0.64) and age (WRST, all p-values
> 0.38). Hence, the treatment effects cannot be said to depend on heterogeneity in the
observed subjects’ characteristics.
In order to evaluate the complexity of each treatment, we both directly asked subjects
to rate the perceived complexity and measured the number of errors in the answers to
the control questions and the time spent completing the control questions screen. On
18The original German instructions, along with the experimental software [developed using zTree, Fis-
chbacher, 2007] and the raw data from the experiment, are available upon request.
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average, all pairwise comparisons go in the predicted direction (Table 3.1). However,
while between Formula and Tree there was a significant difference only in the time taken
to answer to the control questions (WRST, p-value = 0.007), but not in both self-reported
complexity (WRST, p-value = 0.444) and the number of errors (WRST, p-value = 0.253),
Decomposed proved significantly more complex in all indicators with respect to both Tree
(WRST p-values: complexity = 0.034, errors 0.068, time 0.000) and Formula (WRST p-
values: complexity = 0.003, errors 0.005, time 0.000).
N Complexity (0-10) Errors (num) Time (sec)
Tree 74 2.32 0.51 104
Formula 72 2.44 0.55 148∗
Decomposed 64 2.89∗,∗∗ 0.95∗,∗∗ 257∗,∗∗
significant with respect to: ∗ row above; ∗∗ two rows above
Table 3.1: Self-reported and objective measures of complexity
Overall, we conclude that we obtain, with respect to the Tree condition, a marginal
increase in complexity under Formula, and a more substantial one under Decomposed.
3.4.2 Aggregate behavior
Consistently with the bulk of the literature on the centipede game, the players did not
adhere to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium but played on into the game. Moreover,
there was some unraveling of the game: in all conditions, the average endnode became
lower with the repetitions. Spearman rank correlation tests confirm that the decrease
in the endnodes over repetitions is significant in each single treatment (Tree: ρ = −0.56,
p-value = 0.000; Formula: ρ = −0.57, p-value = 0.000; Decomposed: ρ = −0.43, p-value
= 0.000). This trend is monotone and qualitatively similar in all conditions,19 with the
partial exception of Decomposed where unraveling is reversed in the last two repetitions,
in which the average endnode slightly (though not significantly) increased. The average
endnodes by repetition and treatment are summarized in Figure 3.4; the distribution of
endnodes in the first and second 6 repetitions for all conditions is instead represented in
Figure 3.3.
Result 1: In all conditions, the players do not adhere to the SPNE, reaching, on average, slightly
more than a third of the game in the first stages. We observe slow but constant unraveling of the
game toward the SPNE as repetitions are played.
19Average reduction by repetition: 0.21, 0.24 and 0.22 in Tree, Formula and Decomposed, respectively
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Figure 3.3: Endnode in the first and second half, by treatment
It should be noted that, with respect to the bulk of existing literature, the distance
from equilibrium in our experiment is, on average, relatively low. Although it is hard to
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Figure 3.4: Mean endnode by treatment and repetition
Repetition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Tree 4.54 4.43 4.24 4.16 3.94 3.67 3.43 3.13 3.03 2.76 2.62 2.27
Formula 5.36 5.27 4.94 4.67 4.39 4.22 3.89 3.67 3.5 3.28 3.02 2.69
Decomposed 5.43 5.15 5.06 4.65 4.62 4.41 3.84 3.62 3.46 3.18 3.22 3.31
Table 3.2: Mean endnode by treatment and repetition
perform a direct comparison, this is consistent with Rapoport et al. [2003], in which im-
posing relatively high stakes from the first decision nodes resulted in closer-to-equilibrium
play. It suggests that the agents engage in deeper strategic reasoning if the stakes of the
game are high, as hypothesized in the foresight determination mechanism outlined in
Chapter 2.
3.4.3 Treatment effects and test of hypotheses
In the following, we analyze treatment effects by making use of the hypotheses laid out
in Section 3.2.
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p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10 p11 p12
Tree
.04 .18 .42 .55 .67 .60 .75 – .67 1 – –
(444) (428) (350) (202) (90) (30) (12) (3) (3) (1) – –
Formula
.00 .11 .31 .43 .63 .54 .51 .5 .33 .24 1 –
(432) (430) (382) (263) (149) (55) (25) (12) (6) (4) (3) –
Decomposed
.00 .12 .31 .42 .49 .47 .40 .71 .5 .33 1 –
(384) (383) (336) (231) (132) (67) (35) (21) (6) (3) (2) –
Table 3.3: Implied take probabilities (number of observations in parentheses)
Both Formula and Decomposed result in later take nodes with respect to the baseline
Tree. We hence find results consistent with a lower incidence of backward induction (Hy-
pothesis 1.2) and have to reject instead that choices are driven by myopia (Hypotheses
1.1).
In the Formula condition subjects stop the game about 23 of an endnode later than in
the Tree condition. This is true both when computing the overall mean across all repe-
titions and when considering each single repetition: the average endnode of Formula is
stably more than half a stage above Tree in each period.
Moreover, a paired histogram of the distribution of endnodes in both conditions (Fig.
3.5) readily shows that the distribution for the Formula condition is shifted to the right
with respect to the Tree distribution; indeed the distribution of endnodes in Formula has
a first-order stochastic dominance over that in Tree, in the sense that, for any endnode, it
always assign a higher probability of ending the game at least there.
Table 3.3 shows, for each treatment, the implied probability of taking, conditional
on reaching a certain decision node. The Tree condition displays a higher conditional
probability of taking for every single decision node.
Result 2: In the Formula condition, subjects exit later than in the Tree condition.
The comparison between the Tree and Decomposed conditions reveals a similar pattern
to the one between Tree and Formula. The peculiarity of the Decomposed condition is that it
features a higher variance of behavior, especially in the first repetitions (see Fig. 3.3), pos-
sibly reflecting the higher self-reported and objective difficulty encountered by subjects
in understanding the game.
In the Decomposed condition, the average endnode is about 23 of an endnode higher
with respect to the Tree sessions, considering the overall average (4.17 vs. 3.52).
A paired histogram of the distribution of endnodes (Fig. 3.5) readily shows that the
distribution in Decomposed first-order stochastically dominates that in Tree; the implied
conditional probabilities of taking (see Table 3.3) is higher in the Tree condition for every
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Figure 3.5: Tree vs. Formula
decision node.
Result 3: In the Decomposed condition, subjects exit later than in the Tree condition.
There appears to be no difference between the Formula and Decomposed conditions,
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once we discount the higher initial variance of the Decomposed condition. The mean
endnode across all repetitions is impressively close in the two treatments, both on ag-
gregate and in each single repetition.
The same apparent similarity emerges when comparing the distributions and the pat-
tern of implied conditional probabilities of taking. Indeed, in Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5,
Formula and Decomposed are almost perfectly overlapping.
Our complexity measures all imply that condition Decomposed is more complex than
Formula; our hypothesis, and the results of the other comparisons, would suggest that
we should observe different behaviors between those treatments. However, a closer look
points out that those treatments are not directly comparable. We come back on this and
other issues regarding the interpretation of the results in the following section.
3.4.4 Discussion
Our results are consistent and robust, especially when compared to our minor treatment
variations: our subjects are all playing exactly the same game, having the chance of expe-
riencing it 12 times, but despite this, differences persist consistently across repetitions20.
Result 2 shows that a simple (and marginal) reduction in the availability of informa-
tion can shift take nodes further away from the equilibrium with no sign of convergence
through repetitions. Cox and James [2012] found exactly the opposite, performing the
same manipulation: their centipede game is presented either in tree format or as a se-
quential Dutch auction, where subjects know the current price and are informed about
future price decrements. Their result is interpreted as an instance of myopia, i.e., not us-
ing information about future nodes, while we interpret ours as evidence of more limited
backward induction, i.e., reduced use of information about future nodes.
This conflict can be defused by considering differences in the base game. Cox and
James [2012] use an incomplete information game which is strategically identical to a
centipede game under any belief about the opponent’s payoffs. Each player is assigned
a starting value, individual and private; a fixed increment is added to this after every
“pass” by the opponent. The player who does not take always earns a payoff of zero.
Those elements build up a setting that is both extremely competitive (strict efficiency
gains are not possible) and complex even in the standard tree format. Facing a further
increase in complexity due to the reduced availability of information, subjects stop ex-
ploring the strategy space deep into the game and just “take the money and run”. The
20One may think that, if the differences across treatments arise because of complexity, they should dis-
appear as the players gain experience. This however is not true: if experience shifts behavior by providing
information on the nodes where the others are more likely to take, initial differences are carried over through
repetitions, as recorded in our data.
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same effect does not appear in our game that is cognitively less demanding and exert less
competitive pressure. Subjects are still affected by reduced availability of information, as
they find it harder to reason backward, and reduce the depth of their strategic thinking.
However, this results in later take nodes.
We try to single out the elements that may drive the effects of reduced availability
of information registered in Cox and James [2012]. Incomplete information, despite for-
mally irrelevant from the strategic point of view, makes the game more complex for one
main reason. The starting value determines the riskiness of passing. Individuals with
the smaller value have little to lose from passing and, in case of a single “pass” by the
opponent, can double their earnings. Individuals with a high value, instead, can lose
quite some money in face of gains that are marginal, compared to their value. Thus one’s
private value, beliefs about the opponent’s, and higher order beliefs affect the likelihood
of passing, adding strategic uncertainty to the base game.
The zero payoff for the player who does not take, on the other hand, adds risk to each
decision to pass. In all treatments, the default choice is passing and is implemented if the
agent does not take within the given time. This feature may interact with both risk and
strategic uncertainty21.
New treatments could address each of these elements and, eventually, reconcile their
data with ours. For example, our payoffs are in the form (4 · t,1 · t), where t is the end-
stage; we could add incomplete information by turning them into (vi · t, vi ·t4 ), where vi is
an individual private value, uniformly distributed around 422. This way of introducing
incomplete information, which is probably the cleanest available (given our payoffs), is
slightly different from theirs: their subjects know the absolute increment of the payoffs,
and the payoff of the opponent if they take; ours would not have any of those elements,
but they would know the ratio between any two payoffs of the opponent (unknown to
their subjects). Thus our subjects would have less information regarding the stakes in
absolute terms23, and more in relative terms24.
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, both effects - i.e. myopic behavior and hampered back-
ward induction - can be rationalized following LBI (see Section 2.3). Starting from a rea-
sonably simple situation, an increase in complexity reduces the foresight of the agent; this
entails that the information regarding distant nodes is used in a more coarsened way,
enhancing the salience of the higher payoffs. This induces him to pass longer through
21The manipulation in Cox and James [2012] also includes a language shift: in the auction format, in order
to take, the player must “Acquire” a good at a certain “Price”, with the payoff being the difference between
his private value for the good and the realized price.
22The other elements have obvious treatment implementations.
23Note that in Cox and James [2012] they do not know what the opponent loses, in absolute terms, if he
takes after the opponent passes.
24Alternatively, one could introduce incomplete information only in the payoffs of the player who takes.
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the game. As complexity increases, at some point, the cost of retrieving and using in-
formation about the distant payoffs may become so high that the players disregard this
information. In this case, it is the sight of the player that shrinks. In the centipede game,
this implies not considering (some of) the efficiency gains that are possible. This, in turns,
may induce the players to act myopically.
Independently on this interpretation, this result suggests cautiousness in generalizing
the effects of institutional format manipulations on strategic reasoning: behavior may
react in different ways, depending on the underlying strategic environment. In particular,
consistent with the results in Devetag and Warglien [2003], the observer should consider
whether the game is complex enough for a marginal increase in the cognitive load to be
able to trigger a shift to a simple heuristic (e.g., myopia) or just throw sand in the gearbox
of strategic thinking.
Result 3 shows that a similar effect appears even using a different manipulation to
enhance complexity. Its interpretation, together with that of the comparison between
Formula and Decomposed, is complicated by a series of possible confounds. The manipu-
lation adopted in Decomposed can be thought as preference non-neutral in the sense that,
by making some features of the payoffs more salient, it may elicit preferences that do not
show up in the base game. The main driver of this effect comes from the representation
of the centipede game as a (sort of) repeated trust game, with a “give and take” framing
attached to each action. This may elicit, on the one hand, preferences for reciprocity25,
possibly leading to later takes, on the other, loss aversion26, leading to the opposite effect.
Also, as the absolute increase in the pie is constant, and shared in constant proportions,
for every Euro that the passing player forgo, the other receives less in every further stage;
if the relative reduction of the efficiency gains is made more salient under Decomposed,
standard other-regarding preferences would imply earlier takes. As we do not have a
proper way to disentangle those effects, we also have problems singling out the pure
effect of complexity27.
One possible solution would be to implement a treatment interacting the manipula-
tions in Formula and Decomposed, leading to a two-by-two design. That is, a treatment
where information is conveyed through words and formulas, with no visual representa-
tion of the game tree, and where the payoffs are framed as gains and losses after every
pass28. This would certainly add in terms of assessing the impact of a marginal increase
25Decomposed is, indeed, similar to the decomposed Prisoner Dilemma, an early example of preference-
eliciting institutional manipulation, where the game is presented as a simultaneous trust game [Evans, 1966;
Pruitt, 1967, see]. In general, this presentation achieves significantly higher cooperation.
26Beacuse it frames the payoffs as gain and losses on top of a (moving) reference point.
27Recall that complexity appears higher in Decomposed than in both other treatments.
28A “pass” at stage t, implies a loss of 3 · t− 1 ECU for the passing player and a gain of 3 · t + 4 for the
other.
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in complexity within the decomposed and the non-decomposed treatments. However, as
far as complexity is concerned as the main treatment variable, the preference-related con-
founds would still be there, complicating the comparison between the decomposed and
non-decomposed treatments.
We leave to future investigations both this and the previous hints for further experi-
mentation based on our results.
3.5 Conclusion
The failure of subgame perfect equilibrium in the centipede game has attracted a number
of scholars, their explanations focusing either on cognitive limitations that hamper back-
ward induction or on preferences that mandate different equilibrium strategies. Under
both, the use of the information on the high payoffs that arise after some decision node
is crucial to determine actions at earlier ones.
Cox and James [2012] have shown that changing the institutional format in a way
that makes information on future payoffs less available, determines a shift toward early
takes. Those are consistent with subgame perfect equilibrium, but are interpreted as an
instance of myopia, according to which the subjects would stop using information on
future (high) payoffs and end the game as soon as possible.
In this paper, we made two small institutional changes to a centipede game that vary
the way in which information is provided to the subjects; both require that the subjects
compute the payoffs at future nodes; one of the two is similar to that in Cox and James
[2012]. We show that making information about future payoffs less available is sufficient,
on average, to significantly delay the decision to take.
Thus, our results are starkly at odds with those in Cox and James [2012]. Given that
our baseline game widely differs from theirs – with our game presenting a much sim-
pler strategic environment – this conflict suggests that enhanced complexity can ham-
per backward induction (i.e., cause reduced use of the information about some future
nodes) or induce myopic behavior (i.e., cause nonuse of the information about some fu-
ture nodes), depending on the background context. We suggest that both effects can be
rationalized under the Limited Backward Induction framework proposed in Chapter 2.
Exploring which factors lead to which of the two outcomes is an exciting research ques-
tion to be explored by future work.
APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
In the following, the English instructions for condition “Tree” are reported. In brackets
are detailed the changes made to adapt the instructions to condition “Formula” (F) and
“Decomposed” (D). The original German instructions are available upon request.
Introduction: common to all conditions
Welcome and thanks for your participation to this experiment. Please remain silent and
switch off your mobile phone. Please do not talk and raise your hand if there are any
specific questions during the experiment: an experimenter will come to your place and
answer your concerns individually. If you violate these rules, we will have to exclude
you from the experiment and all payments.
You receive a 2.5 euro show-up fee for taking part in the experiment. Please read the
following instructions carefully. Prior to the experiment, you will have to answer a few
questions testing your comprehension of these instructions. Please note that, for conve-
nience, the instructions are written in male gender, but refer to both genders equally.
During the experiment you are going to use ECU (Experimental Currency Units). At the
end of the experiment, earned ECU will be converted into euros at an exchange rate of
1 euro = 1 ECUs.
You will take part in a game played by two persons, white and black. You will be ran-
domly assigned the role of white or black, which you will keep for the whole experiment.
The game consists of 12 ordered decision rounds (first round: round=1, ..., last round:
round=12). The players play sequentially. When it is his turn to play, each player can
choose between STOP and CONTINUE.
If a player chooses STOP, the game ends.
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If a player chooses CONTINUE, the game continues, and the other player faces a choice
between STOP and CONTINUE.
White plays first; if he chooses STOP, the game ends, but if he chooses CONTINUE,
black is called to play and decide whether to STOP or CONTINUE, and so on. Thus each
player has at most six choices, with white choosing at round 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 and black
choosing at round 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12. The sequence of choices continues until one player
chooses STOP. If both players choose CONTINUE in every decision round the game ends
at round = 13.
Payoff information: different across conditions
Tree
Below you can see a representation of the game. The game starts from the utmost left.
The color of the circles identifies which player has to decide; the numbers in the circle
represent the decision round; the numbers in the brackets represent the final payment, in
ECU, obtained by each action. In white you see the payoff of white, in black the payoff
of black.
[The image shown to the subjects is reproduced above in Figure 3.1]
Formula
When a player chooses STOP at round = r, the value for him is 4 times the current round,
that is:
VSTOP = 4 · r
The value for the other player is 1 times the current round, that is
VOTHER = 1 · r
Decomposed
Below you can see a representation of the game. The game starts from the utmost left.
The color of the circles identifies which player has to decide; the numbers in the circle
represent the decision round; the numbers in the brackets represent the change in pay-
ments, in ECU, on top of what you have already earned, resulting from each action. The
amount you have earned so far will always be visible on your screen. In white you see
the payoff of white, in black the payoff of black.
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[The image shown to the subjects is reproduced above in Figure 3.2]
Actual play of the game and payment (differences in brackets)
When it is your turn to play, you will see a screen that:
1. reminds you of the current round of the game,
2. shows you the amount you and your partner earn if you choose STOP and
3. asks you to choose between STOP and CONTINUE.
You have 30 seconds to reach a decision. You can revise your choice at any time within
the 30 seconds. The choice is final when you press OK.
When it is not your turn to play, you will see a screen that:
1. reminds you of the current round of the game and
2. shows you the amount you and your partner earn if your partner chooses STOP
Your partner has 30 seconds to make a decision as well. The game continues until one
player chooses STOP or if the last decision round {Tree, Decomposed: on the right of the
above representation} is reached.
{Tree: When the game finishes, payoffs are assigned according to the values in the picture
above. You will be paid according to the values that appear at the point in which the
game stops.}
{Formula: When the game finishes, payoffs are assigned according to the formula detailed
above. You will be paid according to the decision round in which the game stops.}
{Decomposed: You start with a payoff of 4 if you are white, 1 if you are black. After each
decision, your earnings will be updated according to the values that appear in the picture
above. You will be paid what you have earned up to the point at which the game stops.}
You will play the game 12 times. Each time, you will form a couple with a new player
chosen at random from the other participants in this room. You will never play the same
partner twice. Your partners will never play one another.
Only one game of the 12 you play will be paid. At the end of the experiment, one number
between 1 and 12 will be selected at random by the computer, and the corresponding
game will be paid.
For the chosen game the result of you and your partner’s action will be shown on the
screen, and your final payoff will be computed.
Should you have any questions, please raise your hand now. An experimenter will come
to your place and answer your questions in private.
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CHAPTER 4
LIMITED FARSIGHTEDNESS IN
NETWORK FORMATION 1
Abstract
Pairwise stability Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] is the standard stability concept in
network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do
not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are perfectly
farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed.
We design a simple network formation experiment to test these extreme theories, but
find evidence against both of them: the subjects are consistent with an intermediate rule
of behavior, which we interpret as a form of limited farsightedness. On aggregate, the
selection among multiple pairwise stable networks (and the performance of farsighted
stability) crucially depends on the level of farsightedness needed to sustain them, and
not on efficiency or cooperative considerations. Individual behavior analysis corrobo-
rates this interpretation, and suggests, in general, a low level of farsightedness (around
two steps) on the part of the agents.
JEL classification: D85, C91, C92
Keywords: Network formation, experiment, myopic and farsighted stability.
1Joint work with Georg Kirchsteiger (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, CEPR), Ana Mauleon and
Vincent Vannetelbosch (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, CEREC, Facultés Universitaires Saint-
Louis)
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4.1 Introduction
The network structure of social interactions influences a variety of behaviors and eco-
nomic outcomes, including the formation of opinions, decisions on which products to
buy, investment in education, access to jobs, and informal borrowing and lending. A
simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is
to examine the requirement that individuals do not benefit from altering the structure of
the network. Any such requirement must answer the question of how individuals assess
those benefits.
An extreme answer to this problem is to assume perfect myopia on the part of the
agents, as in the pairwise stability notion, defined by Jackson and Wolinsky [1996]. A
network is pairwise stable if no individual benefits from severing one of her links and
no two individuals benefit from adding a link between them, with one benefiting strictly
and the other at least weakly. Individuals are myopic, and not farsighted, in the sense
that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Indeed, the adding or
severing of one link might lead to subsequent addition or severing of another link, and
so on. For instance, individuals might not add a link that appears valuable to them given
the current network, as that might induce the formation of other links, ultimately leading
to lower payoffs for the original individuals.
The von Neumann - Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set (VNMFS) of net-
works predicts which networks one might expect to emerge in the long run when indi-
viduals are farsighted. As the other approaches to farsighted stability,2 it incorporates the
assumption that agents are perfectly farsighted, meaning they can consider sequences of
reactions to their moves of any length. As this constitutes the exact opposite of perfect
myopia, there appears to be an unbridged gap between those extreme theories.
A notable exception is the work of Dutta et al. [2005], which allows for different de-
grees of farsightedness. In their equilibrium concept, for a dynamic Markovian process
of network formation,3 farsightedness is captured by a discount factor, that applies to the
stream of future payoffs. As such, it entangles patience and farsightedness. Moreover,
their dynamic equilibrium model is hardly comparable to the static stability notions,4 in
particular for intermediate values of farsightedness.5
2See the work of Chwe [1994], Xue [1998], Herings et al. [2004, 2009], Mauleon and Vannetelbosch [2004],
Page et al. [2005], and Page and Wooders [2009].
3See Konishi and Ray [2003] for a similar approach to the formation of coalitions.
4There are some random dynamic models of network formation that are based on incentives to form
links such as Watts [2002], Jackson and Watts [2002], and Tercieux and Vannetelbosch [2006]. These models
aim to use the random process to select from the set of pairwise stable networks.
5A discount factor of zero, properly corresponds to myopia. At the same time, we argue that a discount
factor of one leads the process close to one in which people only care about the end state, as in the notions
of farsighted stability. For intermediate values, the stream of future payoffs matters in a way that cannot be
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In our paper we test the myopic and the (possibly limited) farsighted types of behav-
iors in the context of network formation and compare the stability notions that are based
on them. Network formation is hard to study in the field, as many potentially conflicting
factors are at work. Consequently, we run laboratory experiments. To the best of our
knowledge, this constitutes the first experimental test of farsightedness versus myopia
in network formation.
In the experiment, groups of four subjects had to form a network. More specifically,
they were allowed sequentially to add or sever one link at a time: a link was chosen at
random and the agents involved in the link had to decide if they wanted to form it (if
it had not been formed yet) or to sever it (if it had been already formed). The process
was repeated until all group members declared they did not want to modify the existing
network. In all of the three treatments, the payoffs were designed such that a group
consisting of myopic agents would never form any link. The treatments are characterized
by slight manipulations of the payoffs, resulting in networks in VNMFS sets featuring
different properties.
In treatment 1, a group composed of farsighted agents would form the complete net-
work. This network provides the players with equal payoffs, is strongly stable, in the
sense that no coalition can improve upon it, and features no farsighted deviations. Thus,
beyond being VNMFS set, the complete network can be seen as attractive in many ways.6
In the other two treatments we vary those features to ascertain their contribution to the
stability of an outcome.
A group composed of farsighted agents would form a triangle “club” network7 or
a line network among all the players, in treatments 2 and 3, respectively. In both, the
payoffs are unequal, with the disadvantaged players earning around half the payoffs of
the others. We remove strong stability in treatment 2, as a coalition of three players can
improve upon the networks in the VNMFS. In treatment 3 the networks in the VNMFS
are strongly stable, but feature a farsighted deviation in two steps. 8 We derive across-
treatment hypothesis based on those properties.
In all the treatments farsighted stability refines the set of pairwise stable networks
(PWS) by selecting the (unique) Pareto dominant network within the set of PWS. Note,
however, that the underlying behavioral assumptions of both notions - myopia versus
farsightedness - are at odds with each other, providing us with general within-treatment
hypothesis.
captured by static stability notions.
6The complete network can be a focal point in itself - only for being the complete network.
7A network formed by a single clique (complete sub-network) of three players.
8Also the VNMFS set in T2 features farsighted deviations, but these are both “weak” and longer. See the
discussion in Section 4.3.2.
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On aggregate, 75 percent of the network finally reached are pairwise stable. In treat-
ments 1 and 2 most of the groups (up to 70 percent of the overall population) reach a
VNMFS set, supporting farsighted network formation. In treatment 3, only one out of
five groups reach a VNMFS set, with half of the groups ending the game in the empty
network. In this treatment, VNMFS sets are accessed almost as often as in the other treat-
ments, but, after some time, most groups leave them.
Given the properties of the VNMFS sets, this asymmetric result is inconsistent with
strong stability - present in treatment 1 and 3, absent in treatment 2 - and can not be
attributed to the inequality in the payoffs - equal in treatment 1, unequal in treatment 2
and 3. Nor it can be explained by other refinements of pairwise stabilility, such as Nash
stability, or Pareto dominance - both present in all treatments. It is, however, perfectly
consistent with the hypothesis derived from limited farsightedness.
We then show that individual behavior supports the interpretation of the aggregate
results as an instance of limited farsightedness. Subjects respond to myopic incentives as
well as to farsighted improving paths of short length. As a consequence if a farsightedly
stable outcome features a farsighted deviation of limited length, the subjects are likely
to follow it: they do not recognize the full chain of reactions that would prevent a fully
farsighted agent to deviate.
Consequently, neither perfect myopia nor perfect farsightedness seem to be good
models of actual behavior. A model of limited farsightedness would be a valuable devel-
opment in network formation.
The number of experiments addressing networks and network formation is rapidly
increasing.9 Relatively few of them, however, deal with pure network formation, in-
tended as a setting where no strategic interactions take place on the network once it has
been formed. Among the notable exceptions stand the experiments of Goeree et al. [2009]
and Falk and Kosfeld [2012]. They investigate the predictive power of a strict Nash net-
work in the framework of Bala and Goyal [2003]. They find low support for this concept
when the Nash network is asymmetric and the agents homogeneous. The main differ-
ence with our design is that they consider a model with unilateral link formation and
apply non-cooperative solution concepts, while in our context of bilateral link formation
those concepts provide implausible predictions [see Bloch and Jackson, 2006].
Closer to our approach is the work of Ziegelmeyer and Pantz [2005], where R&D net-
works in a Cournot oligopoly are investigated. Their results generally support pairwise
stability. In their design pairwise stable networks are also farsightedly stable and thus
there is no tension between myopia and farsightedness.10
9See Kosfeld [2004] for a partial survey.
10They observe huge differences between the case in which the Cournot profits are considered as exoge-
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Finally, Berninghaus et al. [2012] address limited forward-looking behavior with an
experiment on network formation. Relevant features distinguish our work from their
model: (i) they assume unilateral link formation; (ii) players play a coordination game
on the endogenously formed network and thus the assumption on the beliefs about this
latter game affects the predictions; (iii) the forward-looking notion they consider relates
specifically to the interaction between the linking strategies and the strategies in the co-
ordination game. So their experiment combines a test of network formation and strategic
behavior in the coordination game, while our paper is the first to directly investigate
farsightedness and myopia in a network formation context unaffected by any other con-
siderations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we introduce the necessary notation
and definitions. Section 4.3 presents the experimental design and procedures. Section 4.4
reports the experimental results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Networks: notation and definitions
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be the finite set of players who are connected in some network rela-
tionship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus modeled as
a non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the graph and links indicate bilateral
relationships between individuals. Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pairs of
individuals are linked to each other. We write ij ∈ g to indicate that i and j are linked
under the network g. Let gN be the collection of all subsets of N with cardinality 2, so
gN is the complete network. The set of all possible networks or graphs on N is denoted
by G and consists of all subsets of gN . The network obtained by adding link ij to an ex-
isting network g is denoted g + ij and the network that results from deleting link ij from
an existing network g is denoted g − ij. We say that g′ is adjacent to g if g′ = g + ij or
g′ = g− ij for some ij. Let us denote with Ag the networks that are adjacent to g so that
Ag = {g′ | g′ = g + ij ∨ g′ = g− ij, for some ij}, and let A¯g be its complement.
The material payoffs associated to a network are represented by a function x :G→Rn
where xi(g) represents the material payoff that player i obtains in network g. The overall
benefit net of costs that a player enjoys from a network g is modeled by means of a utility
function ui(g) :Rn→R that associates a value to the vector of material payoffs associated
to network g . This might include all sorts of costs, benefits, and externalities.
Let Ni(g) = {j | ij ∈ g} be the set of nodes that i is linked to in network g. The degree of
nously given and identified with the payoffs of the players in the network, and the case in which players
play the production stage after forming the network. This supports pure network formation as the cleanest
setting to study network formation.
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a node is the number of links that involve that node. Thus node i’s degree in a network
g, denoted di(g), is di(g) = #Ni(g). Let Sk(g) be the subset of nodes that have degree k in
network g: Sk(g) = {i ∈ N | di(g) = k}with k ∈ {0,1, ...,n− 1}. The degree distribution of a
network g is a description of the relative frequencies of nodes that have different degrees.
That is, P(k) is the fraction of nodes that have degree k under a degree distribution P,
i.e., P(k) = (#Sk(g))/n. Given a degree distribution, P, we define a class of networks as
CP = {g ∈ G | P(k) = P(k),∀k}. A class of networks is the subset of G with the same
degree distribution.
Consider a network formation process under which mutual consent is needed to form
a link and link deletion is unilateral. A network is pairwise stable if no player benefits
from severing one of their links and no other two players benefit from adding a link
between them, with one benefiting strictly and the other at least weakly. Formally, a
network g is pairwise stable if
(i) for all ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g− ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g− ij), and
(ii) for all ij /∈ g, if ui(g) < ui(g + ij) then uj(g) > uj(g + ij).
A network g′ defeats g if either g′= g− ij and ui(g′)> ui(g) or uj(g′)> uj(g), or if g′=
g + ij with ui(g′) ≥ ui(g) and uj(g′) ≥ uj(g) with at least one inequality holding strictly.
Pairwise stability is equivalent to the statement of not being defeated by an adjacent
network. Agents are assumed to consider only their own incentives when making their
linking choices and not that of other agents. In particular, agents do not take into account
the likely chain of reactions that follow an action, but only its immediate profitability.
Thus, PWS implicitly assumes myopic behavior on the part of the agents.
Farsightedness captures the idea that agents will consider the chain of reactions that
could follow when deviating from the current network, and evaluate the profitability
of such deviation with reference to the final network of the chain of reactions. As a
consequence, a farsighted agent will eventually choose against her immediate interest
if she believes that the sequence of reactions that will follow her action could make her
better off.
A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players
form or sever links based on the improvement the end network offers relative to the
current network. Each network in the sequence differs by one link from the previous
one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the end network
to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the end network. If
a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the link
strictly prefers the end network. We now introduce the formal definition of a farsighted
improving path.
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Definition 1. A farsighted improving path from a network g to a network g′ 6= g is a finite
sequence of graphs g1, . . . , gK with g1 = g and gK = g′ such that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}
either:
(i) gk+1 = gk − ij for some ij such that ui(gK) > ui(gk) or uj(gK) > uj(gk) or
(ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such that ui(gK) > ui(gk) and uj(gK) ≥ uj(gk).
If there exists a farsighted improving path from g to g′, then we write g→ g′. For
a given network g, let F(g) = {g′ ∈ G | g→ g′}. This is the set of networks that can be
reached by a farsighted improving path from g. The von Neumann-Morgenstern pair-
wise farsightedly stable set is obtained by introducing the notion of farsighted improv-
ing path into the standard definition of a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. In other
words, we define a set of networks G to be von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise far-
sightedly stable (VNMFS) if there is no farsighted improving path connecting any two
networks in G and if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside
G leading to some network in G. Formally,
Definition 2. The set of networks G is a von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable
set if
(i) ∀g ∈ G, F(g) ∩ G =∅ (internal stability) and
(ii) ∀g′ ∈G\G, F(g′) ∩ G 6=∅ (external stability).
Although the existence of a VNMFS set is not guaranteed in general, when a VNMFS
set exists it provides narrower predictions than other definitions of farsighted stability, a
feature that is particularly welcome in experimental testing. For instance, a VNMFS set
is always included within the pairwise farsightedly stable sets, as defined by Herings et
al. [2009].11
We now turn to individual behavior. We provide a comprehensive evaluation of the
players’ actions by assessing their consistency with progressive levels of farsightedness.
The definition states that an action prescribing to form (break) a link that is not formed
(has been formed) is consistent with farsightedness of level k, if building (breaking) the
link lies on a farsighted improving path of length smaller or equal than k. An action
prescribing not to form (keep) a link that is not formed (has been formed) is consistent
with farsightedness of level k if forming (breaking) the link does not lie on a farsighted
11A set of networks G ⊆ G is pairwise farsightedly stable if (i) all possible pairwise deviations from any
network g ∈ G to a network outside G are deterred by a credible threat of ending worse off or equally well
off, (ii) there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network
in the set, and (iii) there is no proper subset of G satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii).
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improving path of length smaller or equal than k. Let the length of a path be the number
of steps in the sequence. Call P kg a generic farsighted improving path of length k, starting
from network g, and {P kg} be the set containing all such paths.12 At time t the link ij
is selected, the action of agent i is ait ∈ {0,1}, where 0 means not to form (to break) the
selected link ij, and 1 means to form (to keep) the link ij.
Definition 3. An action ait is consistent with farsightedness of level k if either
(i) ij /∈ gt and ((∃l ≤ k and a P lgt ∈ {P lgt} s.t gt + ij ∈ P lgt) and ait = 1)∨
((@l ≤ k and a P lgt ∈ {P lgt} s.t gt + ij ∈ P lgt) and ait = 0)
or
(ii) ij ∈ gt and ((∃l ≤ k and a P lgt ∈ {P lgt} s.t gt − ij ∈ P lgt) and ait = 0)∨
((@l ≤ k and a P lgt ∈ {P lgt} s.t gt − ij ∈ P lgt) and ait = 1)
As they are equivalent, we call myopic an action that is consistent with farsightedness
of level one - i.e. one that looks at the profitability of adjacent networks. Two aspects in
this definition should be noted. First, an action that aims at changing the current network
and is consistent with some level of farsightedness, including myopia, is also consistent
with higher levels. Second, for an action that does not change the current network, we
implicitly impose a strong assumption on farsighted behavior: that a farsighted agent
should always take a profitable deviation, if available.
Indeed, given that the building blocks of farsightedness are sequences of networks,
farsighted behavior is unambiguously defined only if a choice aims at changing the cur-
rent network. When it does not, we are forced either to draw some further assumptions
or give up categorizing those choices. In the statistical analysis of individual behavior
we pursue both of the alternatives.
4.3 Experimental design and procedures
4.3.1 The game
We consider a simple dynamic link formation game, almost identical to that proposed by
Watts [2001]. Time is a countable infinite set: T = 0,1, ..., t, ...; gt denotes the network that
exists at the end of period t. The process starts at t = 0 with n = 4 unconnected players
12Note that a path of length k will have a sequence of k + 1 networks.
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(g0 coincides with the empty network, g∅). The players meet over time and have the
opportunity to form links with each other.
At every stage t > 0, a link ijt is randomly identified to be updated. At t = 1 each
link from the set gN is selected with uniform probability. At every t > 1, a link ij from
the set gN \ ijt−1 is selected with uniform probability. Thus, a link cannot be selected
twice in two consecutive stages. If the link ij ∈ gt−1, then both i and j can decide uni-
laterally to sever the link; if the link ij /∈ gt−1, then i and j can form the link ij if they
both agree. Once the individuals involved in the link have taken their decisions, gt−1 is
updated accordingly and we move to gt. All group members are informed about both
the decisions taken by the players involved in the selected link and the consequences on
that link. They are informed through a graphical representation of the current network
gt and the associated payoffs. After every stage all group members are asked whether
they want to modify the current network or not. If they unanimously declare they do not
want to, the game ends; otherwise, they move to the next stage.13 To ensure that an end
is reached, a random stopping rule is added after stage 25: at every t≥ 26 the game ends
anyway with probability 0.2.
The game is repeated three times to allow for learning: groups are kept the same
throughout the experiment. Group members are identified through a capital letter (A, B,
C or D). These identity letters are reassigned at every new repetition.
A vector of payoffs is associated to every network: it allocates a number of points
to each player in the network. The subjects receive points depending only on the final
network of each repetition. Thus, their total points are given by the sum of the points
achieved in the final networks of the three repetitions. At the end of the experiment the
points are converted into Euro at the exchange rate of 1 Euro = 6 points.
The subjects are informed about the payoffs associated to every possible network and
know the whole structure of the game from the beginning. Before starting the first repe-
tition the participants have the opportunity of practicing the relation between networks
and payoffs and the functioning of the stages through a training stage and three trial
stages.
4.3.2 Treatments and hypothesis
Since n = 4, it follows that #gN = 6 and #G= 64.
We run three treatments (T1, T2, T3) where we manipulate the payoffs in some net-
works to obtain VNMFS set(s) with different properties. Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 display
the payoffs that were used in the three treatments for each class of networks, CP¯. The
13Subjects are informed about the outcome of the satisfaction choices - i.e. end of the repetition or not -
but not about individual choices.
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Figure 4.1: Payoffs for T1
function of material payoffs satisfies anonymity14 and then, this representation is suf-
ficient to assign a payoff to each player in each possible network configuration. These
numbers were chosen in order to provide the resulting predictions with a set of nice
properties for each treatment that are described below and are summarized in Table 4.1.15
The empty network, g∅, and the four networks in class C5 are PWS in all treatments.
These are the only PWS networks in T2, whereas gN is also PWS under T1, and the net-
works in C7 are also PWS in T3. Furthermore, in T1 and T3, in every network in C5, the
connected agents can improve their situation by cutting both of their links. These net-
works (contrary to the others PWS) are not Nash stable in the terminology of Bloch and
Jackson [2006].16
14Anonimity holds if payoffs in a network are assigned to each player independently of his or his part-
ners’ identity.
15In general, the following considerations are valid for self-regarding agents. In some cases they hold for
other-regarding preferences (for an overview, see Sobel [2005]). Most notably, in T1, assuming the inequity
model of Fehr and Schmidt [1999] does not affect our predictions.
16Pairwise Nash stability is a refinement of both pairwise stability and Nash stability, where one requires
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Figure 4.2: Payoffs for T2
In all treatments, all groups start at g∅, and then groups composed of myopic players
are expected not to move from g∅. This prediction is robust to errors. A sequence of at
least three (T1) or two (T2, T3) links added consecutively by error is needed in order to
change the prediction for myopic agents. In both cases, these sequences of events are
highly unlikely, and our prediction for a myopic group of players is to end up in g∅.
To identify the VNMFS sets, we need to compute F(g) for every g. We can prove the
following results.
Proposition 1. Consider a set of four self-regarding agents (ui(g) = xi(g)). Then,
i in T1 the set G = {gN} is the unique VNMFS set.
ii in T2 the set G = {g|g ∈ C5} is the unique VNMFS set.
that a network be immune to the formation of a new link by any two agents, and the deletion of any number
of links by any individual agent.
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Figure 4.3: Payoffs for T3
iii in T3 a set G is a VNMFS set if and only if G = {g | g ∈ C7 and ,di(g) = di(g′),∀i ∈ N, g′ ∈
G}.
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix C.
In T1 and T2 there is a unique VNMFS set: the complete network (i) and the set
composed of the four networks in C5 (ii), respectively. We will refer to the latter as club
networks. In T3 there are six VNMFS sets. Their union is C7, i.e. it encompasses all line
networks. Each set consists of a pair of line networks with identical degree distribution
(iii).17
We expect a group composed by farsighted agents to end up in a network included
in some VNMFS set. This prediction is robust to errors in the sense that the farsighted
17The pair of line networks in a VNMFS, are equal up to a single permutation of players with the same
degree. For example, there are two networks in C7 where A and B have 2 links each, call them g and g′. A
and B are linked to one another in both networks, but A will be linked to C, and B to D, in g; vice versa in
g′. The set {g, g′} is a VNMFS.
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prediction does not depend on the starting point: from any other network, there is a
farsighted improving path leading to a network in G.
Let f racMYO(Ti) and f racFAR(Ti) be the fraction of groups ending in the myopic and
in the farsighted prediction, respectively, in treatment i. We state the following, mutually
exclusive, hypothesis, regarding perfect myopia and farsightedness.
PWS VNMFS
Myopic
Prediction
Farsighted
Prediction
Unequal
Payoffs
Strongly
Stable
Farsighted
Deviations
T1 g∅,C∗5 , gN {gN} g∅ gN No gN –
T2 g∅,C5 {g|g ∈ C5} g∅ C5 Yes – Three steps∗∗
T3 g∅,C∗5 ,C7
{g, g′|g, g′ ∈ C7 and
di(g) = di(g′),∀i ∈ N} g
∅ C7 Yes g ∈ C7 Two steps
∗ not Nash stable.
∗∗ Weak deviation, based on indifference breaking rule.
Table 4.1: Summary of treatment properties and predictions
Hypothesis 1. (Myopia) In all treatments, a relative majority of the groups end the game in g∅,
and, in particular, for i = 1,2,3:
f racMYO(Ti) > f racFAR(Ti).
Hypothesis 2. (Farsightedness) In all treatments, a relative majority of the groups end the game
in a VNMFS set, and , in particular, for i = 1,2,3:
f racMYO(Ti) < f racFAR(Ti).
In our experiment, if a network is in a VNMFS set, it is also PWS. Even myopic agents
will stay at the farsighted stable network once it is reached. Therefore, one cannot find
direct experimental evidence against PWS as opposed to farsighted stability. But our
experiment discriminates between the different behavioral models that lie behind both
stability concepts. In this way our experiment can provide evidence in favor or against
the farsighted models of network formation in cases where they refine PWS.
The payoffs guarantee that the predicted networks are essentially unique, in the sense
that the networks included in a VNMFS set are isomorphic. Moreover, the predicted net-
works are not strongly efficient in the sense of Jackson and Wolinsky [1996]18 nor Pareto
dominant. Previous experimental studies have shown that efficiency considerations can
drive individual’s behavior (see Engelmann and Strobel [2004]). But generic efficiency
arguments could not explain if a network in some VNMFS set or g∅ were observed in the
18A network g ∈G is strongly efficient if ∑
i∈N
xi(g) ≥ ∑
i∈N
xi(g′) for all g′ ∈G.
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experiment. The networks included in VNMFS sets are (weakly) Pareto dominant within
the set of pariwise Nash stable networks.19
On top of these general hypothesis, the different VNMFS sets differ on three impor-
tant properties, providing some testable across-treatment hypothesis (see Table 4.1).
First, the payoffs are equal in the VNMFS set in T1 (gN) and unequal in T2 (C5) and
T3 (C7). In the latter, the players gaining more obtain around twice as much as the least
well off. Under both conditions, the disadvantaged players can lead the group to leave
the VNMFS set, if they so wish, by severing a link in T3, by adding a link in T2.20 If
other-regarding preferences are sufficiently strong, the VNMFS sets could be less stable
in T2 and in T3, with respect to T1.
Hypothesis 3. The fraction of groups ending the game in a VNMFS set is higher if the networks
that are there included feature equal payoffs for the players. Thus:
i f racFAR(T1) > f racFAR(T2), and
ii f racFAR(T1) > f racFAR(T3).
Second, we also consider stability against changes in links by any coalition of indi-
viduals - i.e. look for strongly stable networks (immune to coalitional deviations). In T1
and T3 the networks included in VNMFS sets are also strongly stable. This is not true
in T2, where strongly stable networks fail to exist.21 In this view the VNMFS set seems
more robust in T1 and in T3 than in T2.
Hypothesis 4. The fraction of groups ending the game in a VNMFS set is higher if the networks
that are there included are strongly stable. Thus:
i f racFAR(T1) > f racFAR(T2), and
ii f racFAR(T3) > f racFAR(T2).
Finally, the networks belonging to the VNMFS sets differ with respect to the presence
and length of farsighted deviations leaving the set. Table 4.2 provides an overview and
an example for each treatment. In T1, there are no farsighted improving paths leaving
the complete network (F(gN) =∅).
In T2, F(g ∈ C5) = {g′ | g′ ∈ C9 ∧ g′ /∈ Ag}. This means that there are farsighted im-
proving paths leaving the VNMFS set and leading to networks in C9 that are not adjacent
19Recently, Carrillo and Gaduh [2012] suggested that the players are able to select the PWS networks that
are Pareto dominant. Our results show that Pareto dominance is not a sufficient criterion to select among
PWS networks.
20Despite needing the agreement of his partner to add a link, adding a link in C5 is highly beneficial to
the already connected agents, so that they are likely to agree on that.
21As shown by Jackson and van den Nouweland [2005] this is equivalent to an empty core in the derived
cooperative game.
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to the initial network g. The path is built as follows: from C5 players move to C9, then
to C10 and finally back to another network in C9. This path relies on the indifference-
breaking convention stating that, in C9, a player with two links is willing to build another
one in order to (move to C10 and then) be exactly in the same situation in another network
in C9.22 Finally, F(g ∈ C9) includes, beyond the neighboring network in C5 and the other
networks in C9, only the networks in C4, reached with a four-step farsighted improving
path. This implies that even groups that leave the VNMFS set for C9 are somewhat stuck
there.
As such, this is a “weak” deviation, that is unlikely to drive the subjects elsewhere
from C5 as a final outcome: the subjects are less likely to move, because the deviation is
longer; in case they do, they are not likely to go beyond C9, as moving from there implies
either a move by an indifferent player or a very long and twisted deviation to C4; finally,
those that are stuck in C9 are likely to move back to C5.23
In T3 there are two-steps farsighted improving paths from any network in a VNMFS
set to any network in another VNMFS set.24 Namely, one of the players with two links
cut any of his existing links (C7→ C3 or C7→ C4). From there, another link will be added
leading back to C7, but in a network where the initial deviator is better off (because he
has only one link). After the first move away from C7 is made, other (short) deviations
are feasible, driving the group away from the VNMFS set (and, most notably, toward g∅).
Those differences bare little meaning in the context of perfect farsightedness. However, to
the extent that the agents may be bounded in their ability to pursue farsighted deviations,
the VNMFS set seems more robust in T1 and in T2 than in T3.
Hypothesis 5. The fraction of groups ending the game in a VNMFS set is higher if the networks
that are there included are robust to short farsighted deviations. Thus:
i f racFAR(T1) > f racFAR(T3), and
ii f racFAR(T2) > f racFAR(T3).
4.3.3 Experimental procedures
The experiment took place at the EELAB of the University of Milan-Bicocca in June 2010
(T1) and April/May 2012 (T2,T3). The computerized program was developed using Z-
tree [Fischbacher, 2007]. We run 16 sessions for a total of 288 participants and 72 groups.
22One may question how reasonable it is to keep the same indifference-breaking conventions in the case
of farsighted moves as in the myopic case.
23This does not mean, however, that the presence of such a deviation should have no influence on the
play throughout the game.
24There are other farsighted deviations, longer than four steps.
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Table 4.2: Farsighted deviations from VNMFS sets
Those corresponds to 36 independent observations for T1, and 18 independent observa-
tions for T2 and T3. Table 4.3 summarizes sessions’ details. Participants were under-
graduate students from various disciplines,25 recruited through an announcement on the
EELAB website. No subject participated in more than one session.
Subjects were randomly assigned to individual terminals and were not allowed to
communicate during the experiment. Instructions were read aloud (see Appendix D for
an English translation of the instructions). Participants were asked to fill in a control
questionnaire; the experiment started only when all the subjects had correctly completed
the task.
Sessions took on average 90 minutes, including instructions, control and final ques-
25Sociology, economics, business, psychology, statistics, computer science, law, biology, medicine, math-
ematics, pedagogy and engineering.
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tionnaire phases. Average payment was 16.10 Euro (no show up fee was paid) with a
minimum of 4.70 and a maximum of 32.40 Euro.
Date Participants Groups (Ind. Obs) Treatment
1 Jun 2010 24 6 T1
2 Jun 2010 24 6 T1
3 Jun 2010 24 6 T1
4 Jun 2010 24 6 T1
5 Jun 2010 24 6 T1
6 Jun 2010 24 6 T1
7 Apr 2012 16 4 T2
8 Apr 2012 16 4 T2
9 Apr 2012 16 4 T2
10 May 2012 16 4 T3
11 May 2012 16 4 T3
12 May 2012 16 4 T3
13 May 2012 16 4 T3
14 May 2012 16 4 T2
15∗ May 2012 8 2 T2
16∗ May 2012 8 2 T3
∗ Sessions 15 and 16 were run at the same time.
Table 4.3: Sessions
4.4 Results
In this section we first show how both perfect myopia and farsightedness are inconsistent
with the networks formed, whereas limited farsightedness can reconcile the different re-
sults in all treatments. We then investigate this hypothesis using individual data, finding
clear evidence of the relevance of limited levels of farsightedness.
We start by considering groups’ final networks. Figure 4.4 classifies groups with re-
spect to their final network. Figure 4.5 provides the same information for each repetition
(period). In every treatment, around three out of four groups reach a PWS network.26
This percentage increases consistently across repetitions within each single treatment,
except between the second and third repetition of T3.
The distribution within PWS networks shows different patterns across treatments. In
T1 and T2 the fraction of groups ending up in the VNMFS set is consistently higher than
26This high percentage is reassuring on the subjects’ ability to understand the game, as it would hardly
result from generalized non-meaningful play.
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Figure 4.4: Group final network, by type of outcome
that ending up in g∅. This difference increases across repetitions with the farsighted and
the myopic outcome accounting for around 70 and below 20 percent of the final networks,
respectively, in the last repetition.
This pattern is almost reversed in T3. The final network is g∅ for half of the groups,
with this percentage peaking at 60 percent in the second repetition. A VNMFS set is
reached by about 20 percent of the groups in all repetitions.27
We use the Pearson’s chi-square and the Likelihood Ratio test to determine whether
the relative frequencies of the myopic and the farsighted outcome differ or not within
treatments and conclude that those differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level
in each single treatment.28 Running the tests for each single repetition leads to significant
27Around 90 percent of the groups move from the empty network. As a consequence we gather indirect
evidence about the behavior of groups that do not start from a pairwise stable network.
28We run the tests on the distributions obtained for outcomes - i.e. myopic, farsighted, other -, for net-
work classes and for single networks. We run them against different assumptions for the frequencies that are
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Figure 4.5: Group final network, by type of outcome and repetition
differences in repetitions two and three of T1 and repetition three of T2.29 Given that
those differences go in opposite direction in T3, with respect to T1 and T2, those results
imply a rejection of both Hypothesis 1 and 2.
Result 1: The predicted stable networks (PWS) account, on aggregate, for 75 percent of our
groups’ final outcomes. The VNMFS sets account for most of those observations in T1 and T2,
but not in T3. The reverse holds for the myopic prediction, which shows some success only in T3.
Thus, both perfect myopia (H.1) and farsightedness (H.2) fail to rationalize our results.
We use a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to compare the distribution of aggre-
gate outcomes - i.e. myopic, farsighted, other - across treatments. As expected, we find
not being tested under the null hypothesis (H0: equality of frequencies for myopic and fardighted outcome):
uniform distribution, uniform given the actual cumulative frequency of myopic and farsighted, actual fre-
quencies. The results are identical across all specifications.
29Repetition two of T2 is significant at the 0.1 level. Note that we collected fewer observations for T2 and
T3 than for T1.
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that the distribution of outcomes in T1 and T2 are significantly different from that in T3
at the 0.05 level. When comparing T1 and T2 we do not find their distributions to be sig-
nificantly different. This leads us to reject both Hypothesis 3 and 4, as we do not find the
inequality of the payoffs nor strong stability to affect systematically the stability of the
VNMFS sets. The results are, instead, consistent with Hypothesis 5, supporting limited
farsightedness.
Between one fifth and one third of the groups did not end up neither in the myopic
nor in the farsighted prediction; we generally refer to this category as “other”. Remark-
ably, a vast majority of those, between 72 and 77 percent, ended the game in networks
that are direct neighbors of either of the two. The specific figures are as follows: in T1, 50
and 23 percent of those ended up at one step from the empty and the complete network,
and thus in C2 and C10, respectively; in T2, 61 percent resulted in C9, at one step from the
VNMFS set, 16 percent in C2; in T3, 39 percent were in C2, while 33 percent in C4. We note
that in T2 and T3, the groups that were close to a VNMFS set happened to be precisely
on the first step of the farsighted deviations outlined above.
Result 2: The asymmetric performance of the VNMFS sets in T3 with respect to T1 and T2
can not be explained by payoff inequality or coalitional stability, leading to a rejection of both
Hypothesis 3 and 4. The results are, instead, consistent with limited farsightedness (H.5).
Table 4.4 reports the change in the outcome of individual groups from Period 1 to 2
and from Period 2 to 3, for all treatments. For example, the row “Farsighted” from the
upper-left panel (T1, Period 1 - Period 2) shows that in T1, among those groups who
reached the complete network in period 1, only 7 percent switched to the empty, myopic
network in period 2, whereas 93 percent of the groups also reached the complete network
in period 2. But among those groups who ended up in the empty network in period 1
(row “Myopic”), only 20 percent stayed at the empty network in period 2, whereas 50
percent switched to the complete network, and 30 percent to an unstable network. Simi-
larly, among the groups who ended up in some other network in period 1 (row “Other”),
55 percent of them switched to the complete network in period 2, while only 18 percent
of them switched to the empty network.
Table 4.4 shows that groups that reached a VNMFS set in a previous period are able to
replicate the result in T1 and T2: the Farsighted-Farsighted cell displays a fraction close
or above 80 percent in the corresponding panels. The other categories display greater mo-
bility across time. Some of them reach a VNMFS set, others fluctuate among the empty
network and the Other category. Again, a striking difference appears comparing those
results with the right-hand side panels, corresponding to T3. Around two thirds of the
groups that end in the empty network in one repetition, replicate this outcome in the sub-
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sequent one. This is the only outcome showing some persistence; the farsighted outcome,
in particular is much less stable across repetitions.
Table 4.5 displays, for each class of networks, a set of descriptive statistics regarding
the groups’ decision throughout the game, thus moving beyond the analysis of the final
outcomes. The first three columns give us for each treatment the number of times groups
leave and access each class of networks, together with their ratio. It is not surprising,
from the previous analysis, that most networks are always left. More interesting is that
even the networks that account for a significant fraction of the final outcomes, with the
exception of the complete network in T1, are often left once accessed. This happens 47
percent of the time for C5 in T2, and 71 and 75 percent for C1 and C7, respectively, in T3.
The columns labeled ”Destinations” in Table 4.5 report the major receivers of the out-
flows from each class of network, and their share of those outflows. We are particularly
interested in the results for C7 in T3. It turns out that two thirds of the groups that left a
VNMFS set in T3 did so consistently with the short farsighted deviation described above
(destinations C3 and C4, see Table 4.2). Note also that of the groups that left the VN-
MFS set in T2 (C5), more than 90 percent did so consistently with a farsighted deviation
(destination C9).
The last three columns display the average number of consecutive stages the groups
stayed in a network, which we consider as another marker of the absorbing power of
a network. In T1, when groups reach the complete network, they immediately decide
to end the game.30 In T2 and T3 the players cannot decide to stop the game when they
reach a VNMFS set, probably due to the asymmetries in their payoffs. Nevertheless they
spend more consecutive stages there than in any other class. In T2 this results in a high
percentage of groups ending the game in C5. In T3 the players leave C7 more often before
the end of the game, despite staying there for more than five rounds, on average. 31
Consistently, on average a game lasted longer in T3 (22.93 stages), followed by T2 (21.5)
and T1 (17.73).
All the presented results are in line with Hypothesis 5 as a way to reconcile the aggre-
gate outcomes. The latters, as said, can not be rationalized using traditional theoretical
arguments. In T3, the VNMFS sets are Pareto efficient, Pareto dominant among the PWS
networks, and strongly stable (a condition not met in T2). Our interpretation is that the
VNMFS sets are less robust to limitedly farsighted deviations in T3. As discussed in
30This fact explains why gN displays a low average stay, despite it is the final network for a majority of
the groups.
31Note the relatively high numbers for C5 in T1 and T3; those networks feature relatively low payoffs and
are not Nash stable (the connected players can be better off by cutting two of their existing links), though
they are PWS. Note also the high number for C9 in T2. Those networks are often reached when an unsatisfied
player in a VNMFS set takes a non-myopic move. As expected, this deviation is generally unsuccessful, in
the sense that the group is stuck in C9 until a backward move is taken by the same player.
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Section 4.3.2 there are farsighted improving paths in two steps leaving any g ∈ C7 and
reaching another network in the same class. Both steps imply a strict improvement in
the final network with respect to the current one (see table 4.2). Deviations leaving the
VNMFS set in T2 are longer and less feasible as they include some players adding a link
only to be as well off in the final network as they are in the current one.
An alternative interpretation would be that the multiplicity of networks that are in
a VNMFS set generate coordination problems among the players. This problem is not
present in T1 and has an obvious solution in T2, given the sequential nature of the game.32
In T3, agents with two links are worse off than the agents with one link, in network class
C7. Hence, agents have a strategic incentive to build only one link, and let the others
build two. However, this interpretation is refuted by our data. According to it, we would
observe the agents having problems in reaching C7, and not moving away once they are
there. We observe almost the opposite. As shown in Table 4.5, in T3 the groups ended
the game in C7 only in ten out of the forty-two times they accessed it. The same ratio (for
C5) is twenty-nine out of fifty-five in T2. Thus the groups have more problems staying in
C7 than accessing it.
We thus explore the relevance of limited farsightedness, analyzing individual behav-
ior. Before doing so, we should stress that limited farsightedness, as its extreme counter-
parts, is meant to be a tool for assessing the stability of a certain state. As such, it should
not be interpreted as a proper model of individual strategic behavior, and the following
analysis should be understood accordingly.
We build the vectors of choices of virtual players endowed with different levels of
limited farsightedness, including myopia, according to Definition 3. Those are vectors of
dummies, f ijik gt , for k = 1,2, . . . , containing the ideal actions of an individual i, with level
of farsightedness k, choosing over link ij in network gt.
Recall that an action is consistent with farsightedness of level k if it lies on a farsighted
improving path of length (weakly) shorter than k; k = 1 is identical to myopia. To lie on
a farsighted improving path, an action must imply moving from the current network.
Categorizing choices that imply inaction - i.e. staying in the current network - is more
problematic. According to Definition 3, those actions are consistent with farsightedness
of level k if moving would not be farsighted of level k, which equals assuming that a
farsighted agent should always take any farsighted improving path, imposing a strong
restriction on farsighted behavior.33 As a throughout theoretical analysis of limited far-
sightedness goes beyond the scope of the present paper, we will tackle this issue by run-
32As the connected agents in a VNMFS set are better off, the first agents that are proposed a link on a
path to C5 should build them.
33We note that this restriction is not problematic for myopic behavior.
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ning the analysis twice, on two set of decisions: the full set of choices, and its restriction
to the actions that imply moving from the current network - i.e. excluding those that
result in inaction. We will refer to the former set as choices, and to the latter as paths.34
Figure 4.6: Fraction of choices consistent with each behavioral benchmark
In Figure 4.6 we represent the fraction of choices that are consistent with myopia and
progressive levels of limited farsightedness, over stages. Starting relatively low, the frac-
tion of choices that are consistent with myopia remains approximately stable, above 60
percent, in the central part of the game, and is somewhat higher in the last stages. In-
cluding farsightedness of level two increases the fraction of consistent choices by about
15 percentage points. Another 10 percent is added by farsightedness of level three, whilst
higher level of farsightedness result in improvements that are only marginal.35 This pic-
ture suggests, once more, that myopic incentives were a main guide for decision making
in our framework; however agents often departed from those, following short farsighted
deviations, with relevant consequences on the final outcomes.
34This set actually identifies the paths - i.e. sequences of different networks - the groups walk through.
35The picture is qualitatively similar across treatments.
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We perform a regression analysis to explore the relation between the actual choices,
aijigt , and the ideal benchmarks, f
ij
ik gt
, up to a level of farsightedness of four. This exercise
suffers from many statistical limitations. In particular, the number of choices each agent
takes is endogenous, as groups can decide when to stop a game. We apply a two-steps
Heckman selection model [Heckman, 1979] to address this issue.36
We estimate a (panel) linear probability model (LPM) with random effects, where the
actions aijigt are regressed, conditional on being observed, over the benchmark choices,
Fijigt = { f
ij
ik gt
}4k=1, and a set of controls, Xijigt , including characteristics of the choice prob-
lem and of the individual. The unobservable characteristics of the individual i, assumed
independent from the attributes of the decision problem, are captured by νi, resulting in
the LPM specification:
P(aijigt = 1 | z∗i > 0, F
ij
igt , X
ij
igt) = β0 + F
ij
igtβ+ λˆitβλ + X
ij
igtγ+ νi (4.1)
where λˆit is the estimate of the inverse Mills ratio from the selection equation:
z∗it = δWit + ui
zit =
1 if z∗it > 00 if z∗it ≤ 0 (4.2)
where z∗it is the latent variable capturing the propensity of a choice to be selected, zit is
a dummy variable indicating whether we observe the choice or not, and ui is a normal
error term. Wit is the set of regressors that explain the selection of observations, including
all controls Xijigt that are applicable
37, plus a set of restrictions. We use as restrictions38 in
the selection equation dummies for each treatment and for each type of final outcome
(myopic, farsighted, other). We do not include the treatments in the main regression be-
cause we have no reason to think that they have any effect on single decisions, but for the
effect of the different payoffs, which are already accounted for through our main regres-
sors. A similar reasoning holds for the final outcomes of the groups. The restrictions are
justified as both the treatments and the group final outcomes are relevant determinants
of the time when the agents stop the game.
We run this specification on both choices and paths, with and without group fixed ef-
36We are aware of the limitations of this approach in the case of a binary independent variable; Nicoletti
and Peracchi [2001] show that the bias of two-stage methods might not be severe when the correlation of
unobservables is low.
37The controls that refer to the decision problem are unobservable is the observation is not selected.
38That is, we include those variables in Wit, but not in X
ij
igt
.
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Choices Paths
Group effects: Group effects:
No Yes No Yes
Myopic
.150∗∗∗ .142∗∗∗ −.144∗∗∗ −.178∗∗∗
(.027) (.027) (.013) (.014)
Farsighted 2
.048∗∗ .040∗ .051∗∗∗ .052∗∗∗
(.022) (.023) (.014) (.014)
Farsighted 3
.014 .031 .059∗∗∗ .122∗∗∗
(.028) (.029) (.019) (.020)
Farsighted 4
-.020 −.035∗ .379∗∗∗ .364∗∗∗
(.020) (.019) (.036) (.035)
Inv. Mills
.116∗∗∗ .013 .079∗∗∗ .004
(.023) (.034) (.011) (.018)
Constant
.671∗∗∗ .888∗∗∗ .534∗∗∗ .640∗∗∗
(.119) (.143) (.069) (.069)
N. obs 6166 6166 3003 3003
N. subjects 288
N. groups 72
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ statistical significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Controls include the stage, the repetition and a set of individual characteristics.
Table 4.6: Estimates results for the main regressions of a two-steps Heckman selection
model (Robust Std errors in parentheses)
fects,39 giving the four specifications shown in Table 4.6. There is a major shift between
the left-hand side and the right-hand side specifications. When considering choices, my-
opic behavior and farsightedness of level two have a positive and significant coefficient.
For higher levels of farsightedness the coefficient eventually turns negative (though not
significantly different form zero). The picture is reverted with paths. Myopia has a neg-
ative and significant coefficient, and those for all farsightedness levels are positive and
significant. Level two is the only variable to show a stable explanatory power across
specifications.
Combining the results, we see that subjects often refused to move from the cur-
rent network, because of myopic incentives. When they move, they do so also against
their immediate interest, following farsighted improving paths (even of relatively high
length); nevertheless, they regularly do not move even if a lengthy farsighted improving
path is available. The coefficients for farsightedness of level two (and myopia) suggest
that agents generally take myopic and farsighted improving paths of length two when
those are available, and refuse to move when neither of the two is.
39Errors are always clustered at the group level.
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This interpretation is consistent with the aggregate results, and in particular with
the observation that PWS networks express a high absorbing power, even in those cases
where they are eventually left by the subjects. The results for farsightedness of level
two are suggestive, as it is exactly the level that would explain the differences between
T3 and the other treatments. Overall, low levels of farsightedness look like important
determinants of individual behavior.
Result 3: Individual behavior is best explained by low level of farsightedness (nesting myopia).
Despite the observed impact of myopic incentives, the subjects often disregard them and take far-
sighted deviations. This limitedly farsighted behavior consistently explains the differences across
treatments, supporting Hypothesis 5 as a rationale for Result 1.
We are aware that the statistical approach suffers from important limitations. We do
not properly take into account the effect of the past choices of the same individual and of
the group, though it is likely that the path of a group has a huge influence on the behavior
of the subjects. Moreover, the different results for paths and choices are, at least partially,
an artifact of the way in which the regressors are constructed. In particular, the ex ante
probability that modifying a network is consistent with some level of farsightedness is
increasing in the level itself.
Despite those limitations, the interpretation of the aggregate results as determined by
the behavior of limitedly farsighted agents is supported by our analysis.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper reports an experimental test of the most used stability notions for network
formation. In particular, by studying the performance of pairwise stability and of von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability, we test whether subjects behave according
to myopia or farsightedness when forming a network, allowing for limited levels of far-
sightedness. As far as we know this is the first experimental investigation into this issue.
The results show that both of the extreme theories, perfect myopia and farsightedness,
are inconsistent with our data, and suggest that the subjects are only limitedly farsighted.
Agents reach a stable network in 75 percent of the cases, and more so as the game is
repeated. In two of the treatments, a vast majority reach a von Neumann-Morgenstern
farsightedly stable set. In the third treatment, where the farsighted prediction is not
robust to limitedly farsighted deviations, they fail to do so, and 50 percent of them end
up in the myopic prediction.
The properties of the treatments enable us to attribute this asymmetry to a form of
limited farsightedness, and individual behavior analysis confirms this interpretation:
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low levels of farsightedness, nesting myopia as the lowest level, best explain our data.
Our results opens the way to new interesting research questions. While the literature
has concentrated on the extreme cases of perfect myopia and perfect farsightedness, our
experimental results suggests that an intermediate approach could provide a valuable
alternative and a promising refinement of pairwise stability.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. To avoid reporting the farsighted improving path for each single
network, let gi be a generic network in class Ci and ci ⊂ Ci a generic proper subset of the
corresponding class. We will write gi → g with g ∈ Cj, and gi → g with g ∈ cj, when the
generic network gi in class Ci reaches with a farsighted improving path all the networks
in class Cj or only a proper subset cj of Cj, respectively.
i In T1 the list of farsighted improving paths among the networks in G is the following:
F(g∅) = {g | g ∈ C10 ∪ C11}
F(g2) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ C10 ∪ C11}
F(g3) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c5 ∪ C10 ∪ C11}
F(g4) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c5 ∪ C10 ∪ C11}
F(g5) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ C10 ∪ C11}
F(g6) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ c5 ∪ C10 ∪ C11}
F(g7) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c3 ∪ c4 ∪ C5 ∪ C10 ∪ C11}
F(g8) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ C5 ∪ c7 ∪ C10 ∪ C11}
F(g9) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ c5 ∪ c6 ∪ c7 ∪ C10 ∪ C11}
F(g10) = {g | g ∈ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ c5 ∪ c6 ∪ C11}
F(gN) =∅.
It follows that gN ∈ F(g), for all g in G \ gN and F(gN) =∅. Thus {gN} is the unique
VNMFS set.
ii In T2 the list of farsighted improving paths among the networks in G is the following:
F(g∅) = {g | g ∈ C5}
F(g2) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ C5 ∪ c9}
F(g3) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ C5 ∪ C9}
F(g4) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ C5 ∪ c9}
F(g5) = {g | g ∈ C9 ∩ A¯g5}
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F(g6) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ C5 ∪ C9}
F(g7) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c3 ∪ c4 ∪ C5 ∪ C9}
F(g8) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ C5 ∪ c7 ∪ C9}
F(g9) = {g | g ∈ c4 ∪ (C5 ∩ Ag9) ∪ (C9 \ g9)}
F(g10) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ C5 ∪ c7 ∪ c8 ∪ C9}
F(gN) = {g | g ∈ C5 ∪ C9 ∪ C10}
The set {g | g ∈ C5} is a VNMFS set. It is reached by any network outside the set and
there are no paths between any two networks in the set. Let us check that it is unique.
Consider first a candidate set that does not include any network in C5. It must then
be reached by each single network in C5, which implies this set should include at
least two networks that belong to C9. Given that {g′ | g′ ∈ C9 \ g} ⊂ F(g) for every
g ∈ C9, a set including two networks in C9 is not internally stable.
Now consider a candidate that includes at least one network g ∈ C5. Then it should
include at least one network g′ ∈ C9, such that g′ /∈ F(g) and g /∈ F(g′). This condition
is impossible as all networks in C9 that are not adjacent to a network in C5 are reached
by a farsighted improving path form this network, and all networks in C9 that are
adjacent to a network in C5 reach this network with a farsighted improving path. We
conclude that {g | g ∈ C5} is the unique VNMFS set.
iii In T3 the list of farsighted improving paths among the networks inG is the following:
F(g∅) = {g | g ∈ C7}
F(g2) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ C7 ∪ c10}
F(g3) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ C7 ∪ C10}
F(g4) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c5 ∪ C7 ∪ c10}
F(g5) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ C7 ∪ c10}
F(g6) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ c5 ∪ C7 ∪ C10}
F(g7) = {g | (g ∈ C7 ∧ ∃i s.t. di(g) 6= di(g′)) ∨ g ∈ C10}
F(g8) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c4 ∪ C7 ∪ C10}
F(g9) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ c5 ∪ c6) ∪ C7 ∪ C10}
F(g10) = {g | g ∈ C1 ∪ c2 ∪ c4 ∪ c5 ∪ c6 ∪ C7 ∪ c8 ∪ C10 \ g10}
F(gN) = {g | g ∈ C7 ∪ C10}
A network g ∈ C7 is reached with a farsighted improving path from any other net-
work except for the network g′ ∈ C7, where each single agent has the same degree as
in g. By definition each dyad {g, g′} is a VNMFS set. Let us check there is no other
VNMFS set.
Given the previous argument, any set containing g ∈ C7 and any other network g′′ 6=
g′ (as defined above) does not satisfy internal stability. Consider now a candidate set
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that does not include any network in C7. As it must be reached by networks in C7, it
will necessarily include one and only one (for internal stability) network in C10. Then
it must necessarily include g∅, which violates internal stability.
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APPENDIX D
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome to this experiment in decision-making. In this experiment you can earn money.
The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions you and other participants
make. Please read these instructions carefully. In the experiment you will earn points.
At the end of the experiment we will convert the points you have earned into euros
according to the rate: 6 points equal 1 Euro. You will be paid your earnings privately and
confidentially after the experiment. Throughout the experiment you are not allowed to
communicate with other participants in any way. If you have a question please raise
your hand. One of us will come to your desk to answer it.
Groups
• At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly assign you - and all
other participants - to a group of 4 participants. Group compositions do not change
during the experiment. Hence, you will be in the same group with the same people
throughout the experiment.
• The composition of your group is anonymous. You will not get to know the identi-
ties of the other people in your group, neither during the experiment nor after the
experiment. The other people in your group will also not get to know your identity.
• Each participant in the group will be assigned a letter, A, B, C, or D, that will identify
him. On your computer screen, you will be marked ‘YOU’ as well as with your
identifying letter (A, B, C or D). You will be marked with your identifying letter (A,
B, C or D) on the computer screens of the other people in your group.
• Those identifying letters will be kept fixed within the same round, but will be ran-
domly reassigned at the beginning of every new round.
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Length and articulation of the experiment
• The experiment consists of 3 rounds, each divided into stages.
• The number of stages in each round will depend on the decisions you and the other
people in your group make.
• After a round ends, the following will start, with the same rules as the previous:
actions taken in one round do not affect the subsequent rounds.
General rules: rounds, stages, formation and break of links
• In each round the task is to form and break links with other members of the group.
• You will have the possibility to link with any other participant in your group. That
is, you can end up with any number of links (0, 1, 2 or 3).
• Thus, the number of links that can be formed in your group will be a number between
0 and 6 (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). The set of links that exist in your group at the same time is
called a network.
• Your group starts the first stage of every round with zero links.
• In every stage a network of links is formed, based on your and the other group par-
ticipants decisions. This network is called the current network.
• Your group will enter a new stage with the links that exist in the network that is
formed in the previous stage, according to the following linking rules
Stage rules
• In each stage the computer will select for each group a single link among the six
possible at random. A link cannot be selected twice in two consecutive stages.
• The participants involved in that link will be asked to take a decision in that stage, the
others will be informed about the selected link and will be asked to wait for others’
decisions.
• If this link does not exist at the beginning of the stage, the decision will be whether
to form that link or not. If this link exists at the beginning of the stage, the decision
will be whether to keep or to break that link.
• Thus, in each stage at most one link can be formed or broken.
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Stopping rules
• After every stage you and the other people in your group will be asked if you are
willing to modify the current network. You can answer YES or NO.
• If ALL the people in your group answer NO the round ends and the points associated
to the current network are considered to compute your earnings.
• If at least one person in your group answers YES, the group moves to the next stage.
• After stage 25 a random stopping rule is added. In this case, even if you or any of the
other people in your group are willing to modify the current network, the round will
end with probability 0.2.
Earnings
• To every participant in every network is associated a number of points.
• You will receive points according to the network that exists in your group at the end
of each round.
• Your total earnings will be the sum of the earnings in each of the 3 rounds.
• Thus, the points associated to the networks you and the other people in your group
form at every stage, except for the last of each round, are not considered for the
computation of your earnings.
• You are always informed about the points associated to the current network on screen.
On the top of your screen, you are always informed of the points you earned in the
previous rounds.
• You can learn about the points associated to every other network through the points
sheet you find attached to the instructions. It displays the points associated to every
class of networks:
– In every network, the black dots are the participants in the group; the lines are the
existing links.
– Every class of network is characterized by the number of links each participant has.
– The numbers close to every black dots indicate the number of points a person with
that number of links is earning in that specific class of networks.
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• An example will clarify the relation between network and points and the developing
of the experiment. You will also practice through a training stage.
Concluding remarks
You have reached the end of the instructions. It is important that you understand them.
If anything is unclear to you or if you have questions, please raise your hand. To ensure
that you understood the instructions we ask you to answer a few control questions. After
everyone has answered these control questions correctly the experiment will start.
Bibliography
Atiker, Evren, William S Neilson, and Michael K Price, “Activity Bias and Focal Points in Ex-
tensive Form Games,” February 2011.
Aumann, Robert J., “Reply to binmore,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 17 (1), 138–146.
Bala, Venkatesh and Sanjeev Goyal, “A noncooperative model of network formation,” Econo-
metrica, 2003, 68 (5), 1181–1229.
Bernheim, B Douglas, “Rationalizable strategic behavior,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, 1984, pp. 1007–1028.
Berninghaus, Siegfried K, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, and Marion Ott, “Forward-looking behavior
in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 2012, 75 (1), 35–52.
Binmore, Kenneth G., “A Note on Backward Induction,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 17
(1), 135–137.
Binmore, Kenneth J., John McCarthy, Giovanni Ponti, Larry Samuelson, and Avner Shaked,
“A backward induction experiment,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 104 (1), 48–88.
Bloch, Francis and Matthew O Jackson, “Definitions of equilibrium in network formation
games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, 34 (3), 305–318.
Bolton, Gary E., “A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and evidence,” The American Eco-
nomic Review, December 1991, 81 (5), 1096–1136.
Camerer, Colin F, Teck-Hua Ho, and Juin-Kuan Chong, “A cognitive hierarchy model of games,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004, 119 (3), 861–898.
Capablanca, Jose R., Chess Fundamentals, Revised, Random House Puzzles & Games, 2006.
Cappelletti, Dominique, Werner Güth, and Matteo Ploner, “Being of two minds: Ultimatum
offers under cognitive constraints,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 2011, 32 (6), 940 – 950.
113
114 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carrillo, Juan and Arya Gaduh, “The strategic formation of networks: experimental evidence,”
2012.
Chwe, Michael Suk Young, “Farsighted coalitional stability,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1994, 63
(2), 299–325.
Cooper, David J and John B Van Huyck, “Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and ex-
tensive form representation of games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 110 (2), 290–308.
Costa-Gomes, M., V.P. Crawford, and B. Broseta, “Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form
Games: An Experimental Study,” Econometrica, 2001, 69 (5), 1193–1235.
Cox, J.C. and D. James, “Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games,”
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, March 2012, 80 (2), 883–903.
Crawford, Vincent P., Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, and Nagore Iriberri, “Structural models of
nonequilibrium strategic thinking: Theory, evidence, and applications,” Journal of Economic
Literature. Forthcoming, March 2013, 51 (1), 5–62.
Crumbaugh, Charles M. Evans Gary W.;, “Effects of prisoner’s dilemma format on cooperative
behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, April 1966, 3 (4), 486–488.
Devetag, Giovanna and Massimo Warglien, “Games and phone numbers: Do short-term mem-
ory bounds affect strategic behavior?,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 2003, 24 (2), 189 – 202.
<ce:title>The Economic Psychology of Herbert A. Simon</ce:title>.
Diasakos, Theodoros M, “Complexity and Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Prob-
lems,” Carlo Alberto Notebooks, 2008.
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde, Jürgen Schupp, and Gert G. Wag-
ner, “Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants, And Behavioral Consequences,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011, 9 (3), 522–550.
Duffy, Sean and John Smith, “Cognitive Load in the Multi-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma Game:
Are There Brains in Games?,” July 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1841523.
Dufwenberg, Martin and Georg Kirchsteiger, “A theory of sequential reciprocity,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 2004, 47 (2), 268–298.
, Ramya Sundaram, and David J. Butler, “Epiphany in the Game of 21,” Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 2010, 75 (2), 132–143.
Dutta, Bhaskar, Sayantan Ghosal, and Debraj Ray, “Farsighted network formation,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 2005, 122 (2), 143–164.
Ellingsen, Tore and Robert Ostling, “When does communication improve coordination?,” The
American Economic Review, 2010, 100 (4), 1695–1724.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 115
Engelmann, Dirk and Martin Strobel, “Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences
in simple distribution experiments,” The American Economic Review, 2004, 94 (4), 857–869.
Eyster, Erik and Matthew Rabin, “Cursed Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 2005, 73 (5), 1623–1672.
Falk, Armin and Michael Kosfeld, “It’s all about connections: evidence on network formation,”
Review of Network Economics, 2012, 11 (3).
Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M Schmidt, “A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114 (3), 817–868.
Fey, M., R.D. McKelvey, and T.R. Palfrey, “An experimental study of constant-sum centipede
games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 1996, 25 (3), 269–287.
Fischbacher, Urs, “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments,” Experimental
Economics, 2007, 10 (2), 171–178.
Gneezy, Uri, Aldo Rustichini, and Alexander Vostroknutov, “Experience and insight in the Race
game,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2010, 75 (2), 144–155.
Goeree, Jacob K, Arno Riedl, and Aljaž Ule, “In search of stars: Network formation among
heterogeneous agents,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, 67 (2), 445–466.
Groot, Adriaan D. De, Fernand Gobet, and Riekent W. Jongman, Perception and memory in chess:
Studies in the heuristics of the professional eye., Van Gorcum & Co, 1996.
Harrison, Glenn W. and E. Elisabet Rutström, “Risk Aversion in the Laboratory,” in James C.
Cox and Glenn W. Harrison, eds., Risk Aversion in Experiments, Vol. 12 of Research in Experimental
Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2008, pp. 41–196.
and Kevin A. McCabe, “Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment,” Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 1996, 25 (3), 303–327.
Heckman, James J, “Sample selection bias as a specification error,” Econometrica, 1979, pp. 153–
161.
Herings, P, Ana Mauleon, and Vincent J Vannetelbosch, “Rationalizability for social environ-
ments,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 49 (1), 135–156.
, , and Vincent Vannetelbosch, “Farsightedly stable networks,” Games and Economic Behavior,
2009, 67 (2), 526–541.
Hixon, J. Gregory; Stein-Seroussi Alan; Gilbert Daniel T Swann William B.;, “The fleeting
gleam of praise: Cognitive processes underlying behavioral reactions to self-relevant feed-
back,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Jul 1990, 59 (1), 17–26.
Ho, Teck-Hua and Xuanming Su, “A Dynamic Level-k Model in Centipede Games,” Management
Science, 2013.
116 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jackson, Matthew O and Alison Watts, “The evolution of social and economic networks,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 2002, 106 (2), 265–295.
and Anne van den Nouweland, “Strongly stable networks,” Games and Economic Behavior,
2005, 51 (2), 420–444.
and Asher Wolinsky, “A strategic model of social and economic networks,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 1996, 71 (1), 44–74.
Jehiel, Philippe, “Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games,” Journal of Economic The-
ory, 1995, 67 (2), 497–519.
, “Learning to play limited forecast equilibria,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 22 (2), 274–
298.
, “Repeated games and limited forecasting,” European Economic Review, 1998, 42 (3-5), 543–551.
, “Limited foresight may force cooperation,” Review of Economic Studies, 2001, 68 (2), 369–391.
, “Analogy-based expectation equilibrium,” Journal of Economic theory, 2005, 123 (2), 81–104.
Johnson, Eric J., Colin Camerer, Sankar Sen, and Talia Rymon, “Detecting failures of backward
induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining,” Journal of Economic Theory,
2002, 104 (1), 16–47.
Kagel, John H. and Alvin E. Roth, The handbook of experimental economics, Vol. 1, Princeton Uni-
versity Press Princeton, 1995.
Kawagoe, Toshiji and Hirokazu Takizawa, “Level-k analysis of experimental centipede games,”
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, May 2012, 8 (2-3), 548–566.
Konishi, Hideo and Debraj Ray, “Coalition formation as a dynamic process,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 2003, 110 (1), 1–41.
Kosfeld, Michael, “Economic networks in the laboratory: A survey,” Review of Network Economics,
2004, 3 (1), 20–41.
Kreps, D., Game Theory and Economic Modeling, Oxford University Press, 1990.
Levitt, Steven D., John A. List, and Sally E. Sadoff, “Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction
among Chess Players,” The American Economic Review, 2011, 101 (2), 975–990.
Levy, David N. L. and Monty Newborn, How computers play chess, Computer Science Press, Inc.,
1991.
Maniadis, Zacharias, “Aggregate Information and the Centipede Game: a Theoretical and Ex-
perimental Study,” Nov 2011.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 117
Mauleon, Ana and Vincent Vannetelbosch, “Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition for-
mation games with positive spillovers,” Theory and Decision, 2004, 56 (3), 291–324.
McKelvey, Richard D. and Thomas R. Palfrey, “An experimental study of the centipede game,”
Econometrica, 1992, pp. 803–836.
McKelvey, Richard D and Thomas R Palfrey, “Quantal response equilibria for normal form
games,” Games and economic behavior, 1995, 10 (1), 6–38.
McKelvey, Richard D. and Thomas R. Palfrey, “Quantal response equilibria for extensive form
games,” Experimental economics, 1998, 1 (1), 9–41.
Nagel, Rosemarie and Fang Fang Tang, “Experimental results on the centipede game in normal
form: an investigation on learning,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1998, 42 (2), 356–384.
Nicoletti, Cheti and Franco Peracchi, “Two-step estimation of binary response models with sam-
ple selection,” in “first British Household Panel Survey research conference held in Colchester,
July” Citeseer 2001.
Ochs, Jack and Alvin E. Roth, “An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining,” The American
Economic Review, 1989, 79 (3), 355–384.
Page, Frank H and Myrna Wooders, “Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and
network formation games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, 66 (1), 462–487.
, Myrna H Wooders, and Samir Kamat, “Networks and farsighted stability,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 2005, 120 (2), 257–269.
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio and Oscar Volij, “Field Centipedes,” The American Economic Review,
2009, 99 (4), 1619–1635.
Ponti, Giovanni, “Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game,” June 1996, (96-22 ISSN 1350-6722).
Pruitt, Dean G, “Reward Structure and Cooperation: the Decomposed Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Sep 1967, 7 (1), 21–27.
Rapoport, Amnon, William E. Stein, James E. Parco, and Thomas E. Nicholas, “Equilibrium
play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game,” Games and Economic Behavior,
2003, 43 (2), 239–265.
Reynolds, Robert I., “Search heuristics of chess players of different calibers,” The American journal
of psychology, 1982, 95 (3), 383–392.
Roomets, Alex, “On Limited Foresight in Games,” 2010.
Rosenthal, Robert W., “Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store
Paradox,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1981, 25 (1), 92–100.
118 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Selten, Reinhard, “Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality,” European Economic
Review, 1998, 42 (3-5), 413–436.
Shiv, Baba and Alexander Fedorikhin, “Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect and
Cognition in Consumer Decision Making,” Journal of Consumer Research, December 1999, 26 (3),
278–292.
Smith, Vernon L., “Economics in the Laboratory,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, 8 (1),
113–131.
Sobel, Joel, “Interdependent preferences and reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Literature, 2005, 43
(2), 392–436.
Stahl, Dale O and Paul W Wilson, “On Players? Models of Other Players: Theory and Experi-
mental Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10 (1), 218–254.
Tercieux, Olivier and Vincent Vannetelbosch, “A characterization of stochastically stable net-
works,” International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, 34 (3), 351–369.
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice,” Science, 1981, 211, 453–458.
Watts, Alison, “A dynamic model of network formation,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 34
(2), 331–341.
, “Non-myopic formation of circle networks,” Economics Letters, 2002, 74 (2), 277–282.
Xue, Licun, “Coalitional stability under perfect foresight,” Economic Theory, 1998, 11 (3), 603–627.
Zauner, Klaus G, “A Payoff Uncertainty Explanation of Results in Experimental Centipede
Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1999, 26 (1), 157–185.
Ziegelmeyer, Anthony and Katinka Pantz, “Collaborative networks in experimental triopolies,”
Technical Report, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2005.
Zizzo, Daniel John, “Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments,” Experimental Eco-
nomics, 2010, 13 (1), 75–98.
